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Abstract 
The most influential and dominant philosophical justification for basic income is Philippe 
Van Parijs’ “real freedom for all,” a classical-liberal argument premised on individual freedom. 
My thesis identifies and critiques problems in “real freedom for all,” namely its abstract 
ideological foundation, limited conception of the self, and narrow understanding of valuable 
activity. As a superior justification of basic income, I propose William James’ social ethics: it 
uses listening, experimentation, and revision as foundations for ethics; it acknowledges the 
personal, social, and cultural forces in selfhood; and it recognizes that all activity is valuable in 
the creation and maintenance of cultural norms and habits. I argue that the best justification for 
basic income is “pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy,” in which basic income is an 
example of pragmatic inclusion that creates the conditions for an ethical democracy, wherein 
everyone has access to the decision-making processes that form a culture. 
 
Keywords: William James, Philippe Van Parijs, basic income, Pragmatism, Classical 
Liberalism, freedom, inclusion, individualism, social ethics, economic morality, democracy 
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Suppose that the world’s author put the case to you before creation, saying: “I am going to make 
a world not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the 
condition being that each several agent does its own ‘level best.’ I offer you the chance of taking 
part in such a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It is a real adventure, with real danger, 
yet it may win through. It is a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be done. Will 
you join the procession? Will you trust yourself and trust the other agents enough to face the 
risk?” 
 
—William James
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Introduction 
At first glance, pairing basic income with William James seems odd. Basic income (BI) is 
a popular political proposal for reforming state-sponsored social assistance by providing a 
periodic cash payment to all citizens without a means test or work requirement. William James 
is a philosopher of the late 19th century best known for his work in experimental psychology, 
epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. There is a rich literature arguing for BI from 
different philosophical perspectives,1 but a connection between BI and James, or even BI and 
pragmatism (the philosophical school James helped found), has never been established. For 
most of the twentieth century, scholars considered James’ pragmatism apolitical and amoral, 
but recent scholarship on James’ social ethics challenges this widely-held bias.2 This thesis 
seeks to prove, through a social and political reading of James’ social ethics, that James is an 
 
1 Cf. Steve Birnbaum, Basic Income Reconsidered: Social Justice, Liberalism and the Demands of Equality (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Alex Gourevitch, “Labor Republicanism and the Transformation of Work,” 
Political Theory 41, no. 4 (2013): 591-617; Louise Haagh, “Basic Income, Social Democracy and Control Over 
Time,” Policy & Politics 39, no. 1 (2011): 43-66; Leticia Morales, “The Democratic Case for a Basic Income,” 
Law, Ethics, and Philosophy 6 (2018): 120-37; Charles Murray, “The Social Contract Revisited: Guaranteed 
Income as a Replacement for the Welfare State,” The Foundation for Law, Justice, and Society (Oxford, 2008); 
Philip Pettit, On People Terms. A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Robert Saxton Taylor, Exit Left: Markets and Mobility in Republican Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom For All: What (If Anything) Can Justify 
Capitalism? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A 
Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017); Karl 
Widerquist, Independence, Propertylessness and Basic Income (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
2 Cf. Colin Koopman, “William James’s Politics of Personal Freedom,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
19, no. 2 (2005): 175-86; Alexander Livingston, Damn Great Empires (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016); José Medina, “James on Truth and Solidarity: The Epistemology of Diversity and the Politics of  
Specificity,” in 100 Years of Pragmatism: William James’s Revolutionary Philosophy, ed. J. J. Stuhr 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Hilary Putnam, “Philosophy as a Reconstructive Activity,” in 
Pragmatism as a Way of Life: The Lasting Legacy of William James and John Dewey, ed. D. Macarthur 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2017); David Rondel, Pragmatist Egalitarianism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Andrew F. Smith, “William James and the Politics of Moral Conflict,” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 40, no. 1 (2004): 135-51; Trygve Throntveit, William James and 
the Quest for an Ethical Republic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
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ideal candidate for justifying the implementation of BI in the West, especially in 
contradistinction with its usual liberal and individualist defense. 
In order to argue for a Jamesian defence of BI, I grapple with the most influential text and 
author in the philosophical debate on behalf of BI: Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) 
Can Justify Capitalism? by Philippe Van Parijs. Nearly every academic text that mentions BI 
since Real Freedom’s publication in 1997 debates with or references Van Parijs. Troy 
Henderson is representative of BI scholarship when he says that Van Parijs’ texts are “the most 
ambitious attempt within the literature to ground a justification of BI within a systematic 
normative framework.”3 But Van Parijs’ argument—although admirable in its goals—contains 
a liberal bias with unfortunate consequences.  
Van Parijs does not explicitly outline a cohesive philosophical perspective, so this thesis 
seeks to unearth and evaluate his philosophical assumptions. While I agree with Van Parijs’ 
overarching goals, namely his advocacy for implementing BI, I identify three aspects of 
philosophy which are insufficient: his point of departure, definition of the human self, and his 
judgement social value. I show that they are insufficient because they either neglect the human 
component of ethics, have likely consequences that contradict the egalitarian goals of BI, or do 
a combination of both. The first chapter of my text investigates Van Parijs’ justification for BI 
and explains that it is ultimately based upon the absolutely good character of abstract freedom 
and equality. The second chapter explores the contrasting position I develop, namely the social 
ethics of William James, a philosophical argument in which morality originates in felt human 
 
3 Troy Henderson, “Real Freedom for All Revisited–Normative Justifications of Basic Income,” Basic Income 
Studies 12, no. 1 (2017): 1. 
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experience and socio-ethical norms and practices structured by a fallible common sense. James 
explains that abstractions, created within a repressive common sense, are limited and, I argue, 
inadequate as the foundation of an argument for BI. I then explain James’ ethical method for 
individuals and societies and argue that the precondition for ethical living is pre-moral 
inclusion, in which inclusion precedes any form of ethics. And when broadened to societal 
ethics, I argue that radical inclusion is the prerequisite for a representative common sense, i.e., 
one in which all voices are included and have influence. 
The third chapter then exposes two troubling aspects of Van Parijs’ argument, the first being 
the conception of the human self as an aggregate of essential talents, preferences, and choices 
that result from preferences. Through James’ conceptions of habits and a further development 
of common sense, I argue that Van Parijs’ limited individualism has the potential to place the 
responsibility of poverty on individual preferences and choices because it ignores the social 
aspects of selfhood and accepts the status quo as an adequate measure of good and bad. The 
second aspect of Van Parijs I critique here is his argument for a BI irrespective of employment. 
This component of BI has been widely criticized,4 and Van Parijs defends it by claiming that 
holding a job or making an income is partly possible due to a collective social inheritance from 
the past distributed unequally through income which ought to be distributed more equitably to 
every individual in society. This argument reveals a philosophy in which only activity with 
positive economic consequences (in the form of increased incomes and jobs for the future) is 
 
4 Cf. W. Galston. “What about reciprocity?” in What’s wrong with a free lunch? eds. P. Van Parijs, J. Cohen, and 
J. Rogers (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001); G. Van Donselaar, The right to exploit. Parasitism, scarcity, basic 
income (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Stuart White, “Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for 
an Unconditional Basic Income,” Political Studies, 45, no. 2 (1997); Stuart White, The civic minimum (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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considered valuable. But James shows that every action impacts the moral order and is therefore 
valuable, and I argue that BI is defensible because it creates the conditions in which all forms 
of activity are included and valued. 
In the fourth chapter, I posit an alternative foundation for the justification of BI that avoids 
the pitfalls of Van Parijs’ liberal individualism, namely “pragmatic inclusion for an ethical 
democracy” based in James’ social ethics. First, I listen to the voices of people impacted by the 
contemporary welfare system and investigate which communities have the most influence in 
formal and informal decision-making processes in society. I conclude that social assistance 
programs require reform and that western democracies and societal common sense 
predominantly listen to the wealthiest and exclude everyone else, especially people in poverty, 
in the mediation of moral demands. These problems are minimized with a particular definition 
of BI, namely an income that adequately provides for every individual’s basic needs, 
irrespective of employment, funded by distributing the excessive wealth of the ultra-rich, and a 
particular practical and philosophical end, namely an ethical democracy in which everyone has 
the means to participate in the ethical dialogue that forms common sense. Although there is 
literature that advocates for BI as a necessary component of democracy,5 I show that such a 
justification needs a coherent philosophical perspective, i.e. that of William James, to 
adequately defend BI. Finally, I suggest further political reforms that are pragmatically inclusive 
and would aid BI in the attainment of an ethical democracy. 
 
5 Goodhart, “‘None So Poor that He is Compelled to Sell Himself;’” Morales, “The Democratic Case;” Carole 
Pateman, “Freedom and Democratization: Why Basic Income is to be preferred to Basic Capital,” in The Ethics 
of Stakeholding, eds. K. Dowding et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
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Although there is significant research arguing for BI from an economic paradigm,6 my 
thesis focusses on the ethical justification of BI. It argues that BI scholarship and advocacy 
should reject the classical liberalism of Van Parijs and consider the Jamesian pragmatic 
inclusion for an ethical democracy as its foundation. Van Parijs’ real freedom for all and the 
philosophical worldview that real freedom for all cultivates urgently require revision, and this 
thesis does so with a Jamesian foundation, a democratic goal, and by investigating the practical 
outcomes of current political policies and practices. This text draws upon work I have presented7 
and from the social ethics of William James, primarily found in his texts The Will to Believe and 
Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1896) and in Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old 
Ways of Thinking (1097). BI is a subject of broad current research and has the potential to change 
the socio-political climate in Europe and North America. I hope this text helps move the 
philosophical debate away from individual freedom and toward inclusive democracy. 
  
 
6 Charles M.A. Clark, “The Economics of Poverty in the United States of America,” Oikonomia: The Journal of 
Ethics and Social Sciences 4, no. 3 (2005): 6-19; A. B. Atkinson, Public Economics in Action: The Basic 
Income/Flat Tax Proposal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Thomas Straubhaar, “On the Economics of a 
Universal Basic Income,” Intereconomics 52, no. 2 (2017): 74-80; Karl Widerquist and Michael Anthony Lewis, 
The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee (London: Routledge, 2005).  
7 Nathan Little, “The Ethical Republic in Practice: Societal Implications of William James’s Moral Philosophy” 
(paper presented at the 45th Annual Convention, Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, 
Indianapolis, Indiana, 8-10 March, 2018). 
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Chapter One: Understanding Van Parijs: The Basics of Basic Income 
1.1 Introduction 
For the last three decades, Philippe Van Parijs has been the leading thinker and defender of 
basic income (BI) in the West. Throughout his highly influential and controversial career, he 
argues for the implementation of a BI, unconditionally paid to all on an individual basis, without 
means test or work requirement, subject to the protections of formal freedom, with extra 
allocations to persons with disabilities, and paid at the highest sustainable level. Van Parijs 
justifies BI by arguing that it will create the ideal of a free society, namely what he calls “real 
freedom for all” or real-libertarianism. This ideal is a particular type of world that is neutral on 
the question of the good life and maximizes the minimum level of real freedom for individuals, 
or “the genuine capacity to do whatever one might wish to do.”1 BI creates a society of real 
freedom for all by eliminating poverty, ending involuntary unemployment, and liberating 
workers by making work meaningful for more reasons than the necessity of an income. This 
type of society is ultimately justified because it is structured in such a way that (maximum) 
freedom and (relative) equality can coexist.  
Van Parijs’ justification for BI is based in maximin real freedom, an abstract principle that 
presumes that the best world is one in which everyone is as free and equal as possible. This 
chapter will explain Van Parijs’ practical model of BI, its philosophical justification in real 
freedom for all, and reveal its “ideal-theoretical” foundations, namely that Van Parijs’ BI is 
based in the purely abstract virtues of freedom and equality. The purpose of BI for Van Parijs is 
 
1 Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a 
Sane Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 104. 
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to prove that freedom and (relative) equality are not mutually exclusive, but that these abstract 
ideals can exist simultaneously.  By examining Van Parijs’ BI argument, this chapter seeks to 
lay the groundwork for the rest of the thesis, wherein I argue that advocating for BI from a 
position that privileges principles (such as freedom and equality) over context (felt, human 
experience) leaves Van Parijs’ method of social assistance—one with which I am very 
sympathetic—open to theoretical and political collapse. Before this critique is possible, 
however, this chapter seeks to explain Van Parijs’ argument for BI in his own words and in 
doing so identify his philosophical point of departure. 
 
1.2 Van Parijs’ Basic Income Model 
State-sponsored universal payments have a history of over 200 years and have gone by 
many names: territorial dividend, state bonus, minimum income guarantee, citizens’ wage, and 
universal benefit; but most recently and significantly, advocates call it basic income. Van Parijs’ 
most recent formulation of BI is as follows: “a regular income paid in cash to every individual 
member of a society, irrespective of income from other sources and with no strings attached.”2 
This definition has five components: first, BI is an income distributed regularly—either weekly, 
bi-weekly, or, the interval supported by Van Parijs, monthly—as opposed to a one-off 
endowment given to all at the beginning of adulthood. Second, BI is paid in cash, which 
contrasts to an in-kind benefit such as a food stamp or voucher program. Third, BI is paid to 
every individual member of a society, instead of a benefit paid to households and based upon 
 
2 Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income, 4. 
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household composition. Fourth, BI is paid irrespective of income from other sources—rewarded 
without a means test—to rich and poor alike, rather than a targeted social assistance program 
that only provides benefits to those with incomes under a stipulated minimum.3 The rich repay 
the sum of their BI (and more) through taxation, but no one loses their BI payment. And finally, 
BI is paid with no strings attached, i.e. it is obligation free. While other welfare schemes are 
conditional upon its beneficiaries searching for a job and their willingness to take any job 
available, BI is distributed to all irrespective of employment status. 
Van Parijs’ BI has three qualifications—it cannot be implemented in an absolutely 
unrestrained manner. He advocates for a BI always subject to the protections of formal freedom, 
with extra allocations to persons with disabilities, and pitched at the highest sustainable level. 
Formal freedom is of a negative kind in which people are free exclusively when they are not 
prevented from acting according to their will and are not forced to act in a way inconsistent with 
their desires. A society of people with formal freedom must have “a well-enforced structure of 
property rights which includes the ownership of each by herself.”4 With the formal rights of 
property, security, and self-ownership, people are in theory capable of living formally free lives 
because they cannot be enslaved, i.e. forced to act in a way inconsistent with their desires, and 
they are able to purchase and sell commodities, i.e. engage in the free market according to their 
will. Protection of formal freedom is a necessary precondition to BI according to Van Parijs 
 
3 Van Parijs’ BI is unconcerned with income from other sources, but it is not universal as such; age is considered. 
Children receive a reduced BI and the elderly receive an increased one, and internal endowments, or talents, are 
considered as well, as will be explained below. 
4 Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom For All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 4. 
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because formal property rights and self-ownership precede the actual exercise of real freedom, 
which is the main priority of BI, as is explained in the next section. 
The second constraint regards people with disabilities and falls within Van Parijs’ notion of 
dominated and undominated diversity. The theory of “undominated diversity” comes from 
Bruce Ackerman, another contemporary thinker and advocate for a new type of social 
assistance.5 Ackerman’s theoretical goal is to explain differences between people based on the 
aggregate of individual’s talents, i.e. vectors of talents, as a method for distributing income to 
attain equity. Either person A genetically dominates—i.e. has a “preferable” vector of talents 
to—person B, or A and B have a relation of undominated diversity, in which they have different 
but not unequal vectors of talents. The criterion of that which is a preferable vector of talents is 
the reasonable and absolute agreement6 by everyone in a large community that any single person 
is better endowed than another: domination between two people only occurs “if and only if every 
person (given her own conception of the good life) would prefer to have the former than the 
latter.”7 If person A has a vector of talents preferable to person B’s, he or she is in a state of 
dominated diversity, and is justified in demanding compensatory assistance, while undominated 
diversity, the ideal of a liberal society, affords no assistance. 
For example, if am a slow reader or particularly bad at playing the oboe, I might feel 
dominated by a virtuoso oboist with a photographic memory. But in this case, I am not entitled 
to a unique transfer because at least one person would judge my other internal endowments as 
 
5 Ackerman is an advocate for a type of BI that is distributed in a lump sum at the beginning of adult life. See 
Anne Alstott and Bruce Ackerman, The Stakeholder Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1999). 
6 See footnote 8 below. 
7 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 73. 
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preferable to those of the oboist’s. Maybe I am a better painter, mathematician, or listener, and 
based on the variations of conceptions of the good life in my society, these talents may be 
preferential to some in my community. If everyone preferred the talents of the oboist to my own, 
only then would I be entitled to a differentiated transfer. But in reality, almost every individual 
in a given society lives in a state of undominated diversity, because every person’s conception 
of the good life is different, and the talents that are valuable are diverse.  
But Van Parijs argues that everyone will reasonably agree—as long as their opinions are 
genuine and generally available8—that there are people in society who have vectors of talents 
that are preferable to those of people with physical and mental disabilities, and therefore people 
with disabilities are entitled to more compensation than the rest. If BI is absolutely universal, 
without consideration of undominated diversity, it will not support those with serious 
disabilities, and therefore Van Parijs argues that is not a fair system for all. Van Parijs eliminates 
domination through BI because with an increased BI for people with disabilities, there are no 
pairs of preferable comprehensive—i.e. internal plus external—endowments. In other words, 
although my vector of talents is reasonably preferable to a blind man’s, his financial 
endowments will be preferable to my own, and consequently we exist in a state of undominated 
diversity. Therefore, BI should be reduced overall in order to create a society of undominated 
diversity. Van Parijs explains that in a society of diversity, affluence, and general health, “a 
 
8 Although “weird characters” exist, i.e. those who would rather be blind than see, Van Parijs adds prerequisites 
to the types if opinions that ought to be considered when rationalizing (un)dominated diversity: “What is crucial 
is that the preferences of the weird character should be genuine—she must be fully aware of what life is like 
when one is crippled and not pretend to prefer being crippled just in order to block redistribution—and also that 
they should be generally available—not restricted, for example, to members of a small sect whose outlook is 
totally unknown or unintelligible to the rest of society” (Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 60). 
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small minority of ‘handicapped’ people will be entitled to differentiated tagged transfers, but 
the majority consisting of ‘normal’ people will remain entitled to a universal grant at a level that 
now falls short of the average external endowment but remains positive.”9 BI’s universality 
remains uncontested and differentiated transfers are unrelated to income, but the state of 
dominated vectors of talents is considered for extra compensation.  
The final condition of Van Parijs’ BI is that it must be sustainable, or more specifically, that 
“under a given type of socio-economic regime, the optimal choice, in terms of tax rates and 
basic income differentiation, is the one that can durably sustain, as far as one can predict, the 
highest average basic income.”10 There are a few reasons for this constraint, most notably the 
ethical justification in real freedom for all, which will be explained in the following section. But 
for now, it is enough to say that a sustainable, predictable, and high BI will bolster the economy 
in order to ensure its continuation. BI needs to be sustainable because if it destroys the economy, 
it undermines its sole source of revenue; predictable because an unpredictable BI will cause 
market stagnation; and at the highest level because if BI is too low there will be little impact on 
those in poverty (who are meant to be impacted most positively by BI) and if it is too high the 
right to make an income and acquire wealth would be impossible or disincentivized. BI relies 
on a healthy, growing economy for its existence and survival. 
But it ought not be so high that other welfare services are dismantled. Van Parijs argues that 
“a basic income is by no means an alternative to publicly funded education and health care. Nor 
 
9 Philippe Van Parijs, “Equal Endowments as Undominated Diversity,” Louvain Economic Review 56, No. 3/4 
(1990): 354. 
10 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 39. 
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is it meant to provide a full substitute to earnings-related social insurance benefits funded by 
workers’ contributions.”11 He acknowledges that social benefits would be reduced in any BI 
scheme, but only insofar that BI substitutes “for existing benefits that are lower than it.”12 This 
looks different in different contexts, but subsidized education, healthcare, infrastructure, and 
most other government services will not be disassembled in the name of Van Parijs’ BI. This is 
because these services have “positive externalities on everyone’s opportunities”13 or they consist 
of items “that no one in her right mind might not want to buy.”14 They are social goods that 
benefit everyone, and ought to be excluded from the individualized BI.  
 
1.3 The Economics of Basic Income 
Van Parijs’ suggests a level of BI that is consistent with the conditions explained above, 
namely, the allocation of one fourth of a country’s GDP per capita to BI. In the United States 
that would amount to $1,163 per month, or $135 above the official poverty line according to 
2015 World Bank estimates.15 Van Parijs does not suggest that this estimate is the best or only 
way to implement BI—this amount is only offered because it is “convenient” to have a number 
in mind. As such, this amount is somewhat arbitrary, but it sits “on the border between ‘modest’ 
and ‘generous’ versions of the idea.”16 This level is high, predictable, and sustainable according 
to Van Parijs, but it is only one suggested level amongst many. 
 
11 Philippe Van Parijs, “Basic Income and Social Democracy,” Social Europe Journal (2016), 4. 
12 Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income, 11-2. 
13 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 43. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income, 11.  
16 Ibid.  
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Charles M.A. Clark (2005) argues that the US government could finance current government 
spending and a BI large enough to eliminate poverty (more than $13,000 per year in today’s 
dollars) with a flat income tax rate of only 32%.17 And Van Parijs is unconcerned with the type 
of taxation utilized in funding BI, as he says, “any type of taxation can be used—on bequests, 
donations, labor income, capital income, transactions, consumption, carbon emissions, value 
added, whatever—and any tax profile can be chosen—linear, progressive, regressive, or any 
combination.”18 Further, the costs of administering  the current social support systems would be 
significantly reduced with any type of universal and unconditional welfare alternative, which 
creates another stream of revenue for BI’s funding. 
A regular income, paid to all individuals in cash, without a means-test or work requirement 
is the basic definition of Van Parijs’ BI. But it has qualifications, namely the protection of formal 
freedom, consideration for those in situations of dominated diversity, and its successful 
assimilation in the economy by being at a high level, predictable, and sustainable. The exact 
method and amount of BI’s funding is debatable, but its economic justification is not a subject 
of concern here. The ethics of BI is what is at stake, and Van Parijs’ ethical justification argues 
that BI, subject to the constraints explained above, is a means toward and is justified by a 
theoretical conception of the ideal of a free society, namely, real freedom for all, the explanation 
of which follows. 
 
 
17 Charles M.A. Clark. “The Economics of Poverty in the United States of America.” Oikonomia: The Journal of 
Ethics and Social Sciences, 4, no. 3 (2005): 6-19. 
18 Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income, 107. 
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1.4 Real Freedom for All: Van Parijs’ Ideal Society 
There are two aspects to a society of real freedom for all according to Van Parijs: neutrality 
in the face of differing conceptions of the good life and the maximization of the minimum 
amount of real freedom for individuals. The latter develops from the former. Van Parijs is 
explicitly neutral about—or gives equal respect to—diverse conceptions of the good life. As he 
states, “what counts as a just society should not be determined on the basis of some particular 
conception of the good life.”19 Maximizing the minimum amount of real freedom promotes a 
society where the members are all as free as possible, that which realizes real freedom for all, 
which Van Parijs defines as a “conception of social justice as the fair distribution of the real 
freedom to pursue the realisation of one’s conception of the good life, whatever it is.”20 And 
Van Parijs argues that only a society with his BI can realize real freedom for all. 
Van Parijs argues that a society cannot be theorized to explicitly support one type of life 
because a plurality of conceptions exists about that which constitutes a good life. According to 
Van Parijs, the factor that decides this conception is individual taste, want, or preference. For 
example, there is nothing ethically different between my conception of a good life, which 
consists of a preference for reading books in solitude and pennilessness, and my cousin’s, who 
has more expensive tastes and prefers a life of social prestige and excessive wealth, and 
therefore, a just society cannot privilege one conception of the good life over the other. At the 
same time, people must be held accountable for their preferences: “except in special cases of 
 
19 Van Paris, Real Freedom, 28. 
20 Philippe Van Parijs, “Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-First Century,” Politics & 
Society 32, no. 1 (2004): 18. 
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addiction and the like, people must bear the consequences of the preferences or tastes they have 
on their level of welfare or preference satisfaction.”21 Preferences involve activities; I cannot 
say I am oppressed in a society that allows me to follow my interests, even if it does not provide 
me with the golden toilet and personal chef that my cousin has. Taste cannot figure into the 
theoretical foundation of a society’s method of redistribution because the ideal of a free society 
is neutral about conceptions of the good life.  
The ethical justification for BI for Van Parijs is real freedom for all, or real-libertarianism, 
which provides a defensible conception of a just society, namely one with real freedom. While 
formal freedom incorporates security (freedom from threats) and ownership (freedom to own 
oneself and one’s property), Van Parijs suggests that there is something missing in this idea, 
because “doing anything requires the use of external objects which security and self-ownership 
alone cannot guarantee.”22 Real freedom goes beyond merely negative freedom and adds 
opportunity to the necessary components of freedom; it consists in “not only a matter of having 
the right to do what one might want to do, but also a matter of having the means for doing it.”23 
Troy Henderson explains why this conception of freedom is so radical and expansive:  
Real freedom does not privilege current preferences over future preferences, or even actual 
preferences over possible preferences. Rather, it is centred on the principle of keeping the 
doorway to autonomous decisions and activities permanently ajar for all individuals 
throughout their lives.24 
 
 
21 Ibid., 50. 
22 Ibid., 21. 
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Troy Henderson, “Real Freedom for All Revisited–Normative Justifications of Basic Income,” Basic Income 
Studies 12, no.1 (2017): 2. 
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Real freedom considers current preferences and preferences one might have and defines freedom 
as existing only when people have the means to follow their preferences now and in the future. 
For example, I am formally free in the present if I have the right to purchase an island in the 
Mediterranean, but I am not really free to do so because I do not have the resources to do so. 
And in the example above, if my preferences change and I want to escape the life of a lonely 
philosopher—perhaps to advocate for the oppressed through law or politics—and I cannot 
follow this future preference, my real freedom is again restricted. The important consideration 
of real freedom is the material means of following one’s preferences throughout time. Formal 
freedom is not enough: I am not really free if what I might want to do is out of reach because of 
a lack of material possessions. 
The societal solution that Van Parijs suggests is to maximin real freedom. Van Parijs takes 
the term maximin directly from John Rawls’ “general conception” of justice, which consists of 
one central idea, that “all social primary goods—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, 
and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless unequal distribution of any or 
all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.”25 In a society that maximins real 
freedom, the person with least opportunities has opportunities no smaller than the person with 
least opportunities would have in any other feasible arrangement, and if this condition is 
satisfied, the second person up the scale of opportunity must have no less opportunity than her 
equivalent. In other words, a free society is one that maximizes the opportunity of the minimum, 
 
25 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 303. See Philippe Van Parijs and 
Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 109-13. Van Parijs considers himself a “liberal-egalitarian” philosopher 
and much of his work is based in Rawlsian ideas. 
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or worst off, position (hence the term maximin). The maximin condition is the site of relative 
equality in Van Parijs’ system. Material opportunities must be at their highest level for those in 
the worst material poverty, but also for everyone else in the society. It is a theory that argues 
that the highest level of equality, unless unequal distribution of real freedom is “to the advantage 
of the least favored,” should be sought. This does not mean that everyone needs to have 
absolutely equal material resources—if inequality helps those with least opportunity, i.e., creates 
general economic growth which can fund a higher BI for the least-advantaged, inequality is 
permissible. Maximin real freedom seeks to distribute real freedom in a way that is most 
favourable to those with the least amount of real freedom, thereby creating a society with relative 
(not absolute) equality. 
 
1.5 Real Freedom and Van Parijs’ Basic Income  
Inherent to Van Parijs’ definition of BI (and its constraints) sketched above is a method of 
providing the means to live the way one desires, or a method that maximins real freedom. By 
defining BI insofar that the income is administered with regularity, Van Parijs protects one’s 
opportunity to follow their conception of the good life throughout their lifetime. This long-term 
consideration is essential because as Van Parijs states, people change over time: “The resources 
of the person I shall be at 50 must be protected against the risk of being given away by that other 
person I was at 20.”26 The definition’s distribution in cash gives beneficiaries the opportunity to 
use their money in whatever way they choose, rather than being restricted by in-kind vouchers. 
 
26 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 46. 
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BI’s commitment to individual payments frees people to change living situations if they so 
desire, which is especially significant in situations with abusive and controlling partners. 
Further, individuals in traditional welfare schemes are allocated a reduced income if they decide 
to live with others because traditional payments decrease per individual proportionate to the 
increased number of people living in a household, which creates what Van Parijs calls the 
“loneliness trap.” On the other hand, BI does not penalize people who choose to live together 
through a reduction of benefits but actually encourages cohabitation compared to traditional 
social assistance schemes because living situation is unrelated to BI.  
Concerning the constraints on Van Parijs’ definition and justification for BI, the condition 
of formal freedom is a precondition for any real freedom, undominated diversity gives extra 
opportunity to those with internal disabilities so that they have the means to live according to 
the life they might want, and BI’s condition of being at the highest sustainable level allows the 
economy to continue, because real freedom for all cannot give away all of today’s wealth with 
no consideration given for the people (including ourselves) of the future. The people in the 
current and future economy are given the means to pursue the life they desire—and the life they 
might someday desire—with BI. 
But arguably, the ways that BI achieves real freedom for all most radically is the way it 
impacts poor and working-class people. Van Parijs’ BI eliminates poverty, ends involuntary 
unemployment, and makes work meaningful. People in poverty do not have the real freedom to 
do much beyond that which is necessary for basic survival. When people are trapped in lives 
they despise with little to no opportunity for following their desires, real freedom does not exist. 
But with BI, no one can live in poverty because everyone receives an income which (in most 
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cases) guarantees survival. And once survival is expected, people can choose the life they want 
to live. This is a simple enough point, but it is fundamental to the type of society that justifies 
BI, namely real freedom for all. 
Van Parijs argues that people in poverty and those in the working class have very little 
freedom in current economic and political conditions. He demonstrates that the welfare systems 
in the West are antithetical to real freedom for all because they create involuntary unemployment 
and make work impossible to escape and generally unenriching. Beneficiaries in these welfare 
systems are excluded from entering the workforce because to do so is financially risky and 
irrational. This problem is called the “unemployment trap,” or that which forces people into 
involuntary unemployment. The unemployment trap exists because the jobs that employ people 
with low incomes are notoriously precarious and because, in a means-tested welfare system, 
benefits decrease as earnings increase. As Van Parijs states, “Under a means-tested scheme, 
even precarious earnings cancel the entitlement to part or all of the benefits.”27 If beneficiaries 
are uncertain about any aspect of a prospective job—whether it is their earnings, their capacity 
to cope, or the stability of their position—it is risky to take a job and receive lower, or eliminated, 
benefits. As Wilder points out, welfare reforms in the 1990s tried to avoid this trap in order to 
enhance work incentives “by gradually phasing out welfare benefits as personal income 
increased, as opposed to ceasing benefits outright.”28 But this does not solve the problem that 
 
27 Ibid., 18. 
28 Matt Wilder, “Debating Basic Income: Distributive Justice and the Normative-Technical Nexus,” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2018): 281. 
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any reduction in social assistance caused by employment disincentivizes the desire to earn extra 
income and live the life one desires.  
Instead of such a welfare structure, BI benefits are never reduced or withdrawn, so all the 
earnings people produce directly increase their net incomes. Above the BI “floor,” income will 
be taxed, but the agreed-upon minimum income is never lost. The difference between means-
tested schemes and BI, according to Van Parijs, is clear: “The former provides a safety net that 
fails to catch a great many people it should catch, and in which many get trapped; the latter 
provides a floor on which they can all safely stand.”29 Van Parijs’ BI makes people free to enter 
the workforce (if they desire) by cancelling the unemployment trap and its subsequent 
involuntary unemployment. 
The second way that BI maximins real freedom concerns employment. In today’s world, 
people on social assistance must be employed or must prove that they are searching for 
employment. But if everyone on welfare is required to say “yes” to any job, the employers have 
all of the bargaining power in the employer-employee relationship, or as Van Parijs puts it, 
work-conditionality in welfare systems amounts to “subsidies to the employers.”30 When 
everyone in poverty needs a job or needs to be searching for a job in order to qualify for welfare 
assistance, employers can exploit their employees because they are effectively entitled to any 
worker on welfare. This means that despite the quality of work, workplace, or wage (within 
legal limits), people are effectively “trapped” in jobs because their benefits rely on entering the 
 
29 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 20. 
30 Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income, 22. 
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work-force. While means-tested welfare creates the unemployment trap, work-tested welfare 
creates the employment trap, which forces people to always say “yes” to a job, even if it pays 
little and is unattractive.31  
Alternatively, Van Parijs’ obligation-free BI gives workers the bargaining power with the 
ability to say “no” to a job that is unattractive or disconnected to that individual’s desires. Being 
in the job market or wanting to join the job market has nothing to do with qualifying for benefits. 
Work-unconditionality has ramifications beyond people receiving social assistance. If any 
worker can quit her job at any time without financial repercussions, or at least repercussions that 
threaten general well-being, employers are responsible for attracting and keeping employees. 
The freedom to say “no” results in a culture wherein lousy jobs may not attract workers, and 
employers would be forced to automate or pay their workers better. Speaking to his fellow 
academics, Van Parijs states that “those lousy, poorly-paid jobs which you would not dream of 
doing will need to be paid better—perhaps even better than yours (and ours), and this is a good 
thing.”32 The ability to say no rather than being forced to work fundamentally changes what it 
means to be employed. With BI, people work because they want the benefits that accompany 
work such as meaning, friendship, good pay, etc., instead of working because the other 
alternative is poverty. 
 
1.6 Freedom and (Relative) Equality: The Foundation of Van Parijs’ Basic Income 
 
31 As Wilder points out, being forced to work in this way is fundamentally opposed to the ideals of a free market, 
i.e., the “exchange between free, consenting parties” (Wilder, “Debating Basic Income,” 282). 
32 Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income, 22. 
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Van Parijs argues that BI achieves a society of real freedom for all by eliminating poverty 
and shutting the (un)employment traps, essentially freeing people to choose to work or not to 
work based on personal taste and preference, and by giving everyone an equal economic floor 
on which all are able to live freely. Real freedom for all is Van Parijs’ method for ethically 
justifying BI, that the best ethical republic maximizes opportunity for the individuals with the 
least opportunity in society to choose the lives they might want to live. But the fundamental 
foundation for Van Parijs’ philosophical worldview is contained within two abstract 
conceptions: freedom and equality found in his principle of maximin real freedom. Van Parijs 
states his point of departure in the inaugural paragraph of Real Freedom: 
One: Our capitalist societies are replete with unacceptable inequalities. Two: Freedom is of 
paramount importance. This book is written by someone who strongly holds these two 
convictions. And it is primarily addressed to those who share them with him. One of its most 
central tasks, therefore, is to provide a credible response to the libertarian challenge, that is 
to the claim that these two convictions are mutually exclusive, or that taking freedom 
seriously requires one to endorse most of the inequalities in today’s world—and more.33 
 
The purpose of BI for Van Parijs is to prove that freedom and (relative) equality are not 
mutually exclusive—that these abstract ideals can exist simultaneously. His career has been 
built on proving that a society that includes BI is the best policy mechanism to fulfill these 
conditions, but he does not qualify why these conditions are so essential to a just society. Van 
Parijs presumes that freedom and equality are abstract virtues, good in themselves, and provides 
no further argument as to their grounding or acceptability. This presumption invokes a liberal 
conception of the good, where priority is given first to correct moral principles and then applied 
 
33 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 1. 
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to given contexts. It is in line with Kantian moral absolutism, where “All politics must bend its 
knee before the right.”34 Abstract ideals precede contextual practice in this account; Van Parijs 
asserts that freedom and (maximin) equality, abstract ideals beyond the realm of human 
experience, are absolutely good. He suggests that a particular moral ideology, namely classical 
liberalism, is the best ethical philosophy, irrespective of the moral ideologies of other 
individuals and communities, without justification. And his BI is only defensible if his moral 
ideology and the abstract ideals it defends are correct. Other thinkers, such as Rawls, have 
defended the liberal conception of justice, but Van Parijs assumes a particular worldview from 
which he develops his BI argument without engagement with the problems of liberalism. This 
chapter does not seek to assess the value of such liberal ideals but reveals them as assumptions 
in Van Parijs’ argument. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
Henderson calls Van Parijs’ texts “the most ambitious attempt within the literature to ground 
a justification of BI within a systematic normative framework,”35 and I do not disagree. But that 
does not mean it is a sufficient attempt. This chapter explained in detail the definition of Van 
Parijs’ basic income, namely a regular cash income, paid to every individual, without means-
test or work requirement. It further explained that BI has three major constraints: protection of 
formal freedom, which is the precondition for real freedom, extra allocations to people with 
 
34 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991): 125. 
35 Henderson, “Real Freedom for All Revisited,” 1. 
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disabilities in order to create undominated diversity, and implementation of BI at the highest 
sustainable (and predictable) level in order to maintain a healthy economy. The method for 
justifying BI and its constraints is real freedom for all, an ideal of society we ought to strive 
toward because it maximins freedom and in doing so creates (relative) equality. Van Parijs’ BI 
creates real freedom for all by eliminating poverty, involuntary unemployment, and the 
employment trap, in which workers are able to say “no” to unattractive and unfulfilling jobs. 
The ultimate foundation for BI is in the liberal presumption that freedom and equality are 
absolute goods in every context. I explained that Van Parijs’ justification ends in abstract 
normativity, but the philosophical case for BI is not over. The next chapter will explain a socio-
political ethical philosophy that rejects abstractions as possible foundations for ethics in order 
to show the deficiencies of Van Parijs’ liberal belief in freedom and equality as absolutely good 
ideals.  
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Chapter Two: William James’ Pre-Moral Inclusion: An Anti-Foundational Foundation 
2.1 Introduction 
In the first chapter, I explained Van Parijs’ justification for basic income (BI), the 
foundation for which is ultimately based in freedom and equality. Most explicitly, individual 
freedom is the motive of real freedom for all, while relative equality is its limit. Freedom and 
equality seem to be uncontroversial ideals to endorse. But they are part of the larger system and 
history of liberalism, defined by Van Parijs as a theory “truly committed to an equal concern for 
all and to non-discrimination among conceptions of the good life.”1 Van Parijs considers himself 
a “liberal-egalitarian” philosopher,2 but his justification for BI is closer to Rawls’ procedural 
liberalism and classical liberalism  because his measure of freedom is economic and his measure 
of ethics is (primarily) utilitarian.3 Although there are many important critiques of liberalism, a 
structural critique of the foundations of this ethical account is most warranted for this project.4  
 
1 Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom For All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford: Clarendon  
Press, 1995), 102. 
2 Philippe Van Parijs, “Basic Income and Social Justice: Why Philosophers Disagree,” Joint Joseph  
Rowntree Foundation/University of York Annual Lecture (Toronto), 2009. 
3 See Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a 
Sane Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 109-13. There is a great amount of literature 
on classical liberalism, all of which originate in John Locke and Adam Smith. Cf. Eamonn Butler, Classical 
Liberalism – A Primer (London: London Publishing Partnership, 2015). 
4 There are critiques of liberalism in every dominant political philosophy. For a critique from conservatism, see 
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London: Everyman’s Library, J. M. Dent & Sons, 
1967); from Marxism, see Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker 
(New York: Norton & Company, 1978); from communitarianism see Michael Walzer, “The Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism,” Political Theory 18, no. 1 (1990): 6-23; and from feminism, see Martha Nussbaum, The 
Feminist Critique of Liberalism (The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1997). 
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Will Kymlicka states that, at their cores, liberals “believe in a wishy-washy mixture of 
equality and freedom.”5 This is the case with Van Parijs’ classical liberalism: he proposes an 
ethical philosophy based in pre-existing conceptions of good and bad, i.e. that freedom and 
equality are absolute goods, that are meant to encapsulate all of experience. This is problematic 
because, as I will show through the philosophy of William James, any theory that proposes an 
abstract, intellectual answer to a human question fails to understand what constitutes human 
belief and human morality. As James says, “There can be no difference which doesn’t make a 
difference—no difference in abstract truth which does not express itself in a difference in 
concrete fact, and of conduct consequent upon the fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, 
somewhere, and somewhen.’’6 Philosophy, for James is always practical. Through James’ 
ethical philosophy, I will show that by privileging some ideals, ultimately based in particular 
human perspectives, Van Parijs’ liberal foundation ignores the constitutive factors of morality 
and contradicts its supposed “neutral” assessment of the good life. His faith in liberal 
abstractions is a single ideological perspective within a universe of millions of perspectives, all 
of which should be considered in a case for BI. James’ social ethics, on the other hand, 
transcends ideological differences and advocates for inclusion as the condition for the possibility 
of an ethics. 
In James’ essay, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” he argues that, “there is no 
such thing as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance.”7 He demonstrates that 
 
5 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 1. 
6 William James, “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” in The Writings of William James: A 
Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 349. 
7 William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” in The Writings of William James, 610. 
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good and bad are based in practical, felt human experience. Ethics, for James, is neither a pre-
existing structure nor in any way transcendental, but instead is an intimately human method of 
resolving conflicting moral claims. In this chapter, I will explain James’ social ethics to critique 
Van Parijs’ abstract argument and to propose an alternate foundation for BI: instead of beginning 
with abstract ideals with definite ends, I demonstrate that ethics begins with the inclusion of 
different felt human experiences with ends decided through human interaction. In other words, 
ethics is always already human ethics and demands originate in human feeling, are mediated in 
the social sphere, and fall into an equilibrium in “common sense.” The ethical method through 
which individuals engage with moral standards, or common sense, is threefold: experimentation, 
listening, and revising beliefs and actions (based on the human response heard through 
listening). But experimentation requires other humans and an accurate common sense requires 
as many humans as possible. That a representative ethics follows from the inclusion of other 
humans is the basis of what I call James’ “pre-moral inclusion” condition, which I will argue is 
a better foundation for BI than is Van Parijs’ classical liberalism. Because the ethical republic 
is fallible and incomplete, and many voices are repressed in everyday common sense, radical 
inclusion precedes the possibility of a truly ethical society. This chapter will argue for a new 
foundation for BI, namely the anti-foundational (i.e., not based in abstract ideals) ethical theory 
propounded by James—pre-moral inclusion—and shows that inclusion, not ideals, is the best 
place to ground an argument for BI. 
 
2.2 William James and the Origin of Morality 
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James’ point of departure for explaining morality is contained in a thought experiment: he 
asks his reader to imagine a world without any human beings. In this material world, consisting 
of only physical and chemical facts, James states, “there is no status for good and evil to exist” 
because “goodness, badness, and obligation must be realized somewhere in order to really 
exist.”8 This realization is the felt, human experience of good and bad in relation to the physical 
world. Without human life, good and bad have no relevancy—only in felt human experience 
does activity gain moral or immoral status. A forest fire, for example, has no moral character; 
unless people will be engulfed within it, fire is simply an amoral fact. There cannot be moral 
principles without human existence because morality is always already human morality. Trygve 
Throntveit summarizes James’ perspective by stating that moral principles “become good (or 
evil) only in consciousness; while, conversely, good and evil exist wherever consciousness 
exists.”9 A world without humans is necessarily a world without ethics. 
To continue the thought experiment, James adds a single human being to this universe, and 
instantly personal goods and evils come into existence; that being’s consciousness gives moral 
status to relations in the world. In the universe of this lone sentient being, or what James calls 
“moral solitude,” morality, or more appropriately potential-morality, originates in the 
realization of that being’s feelings of pleasure and pain and their accompanying demands. By 
feeling something as good or bad, the human makes it good or bad, because outside of her 
experience there is no foundation for morality. Hedonistic origins do not explain all human 
 
8 Ibid., 614, (emphasis added). 
9 Trygve Throntveit, “William James’s Ethical Republic,” Journal of the History of Ideas 72, no. 2 (2011): 263. 
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interests; moral (dis)interest may also be generated by personal or intellectual feelings void of 
physical pleasure or pain, or as James states, “directly felt fitnesses between things.”10 For 
example, “the passion for poetry, for mathematics, or for metaphysics—no one of these things 
can be wholly explained by either association or utility, […] a vast number of our moral 
perceptions also are certainly of this secondary and brain‑born kind.”11 But even “fitness” is 
impossible without a human—even a solitary one—who is capable of realizing or interpreting 
her experiences as good or bad. 
Claims of ethics in a world of potential-morality are not true as such because, “In such a 
[moral solitude] it would of course be absurd to raise the question of whether the solitary 
thinker’s judgments of good and ill are true or not. Truth supposes a standard outside of the 
thinker to which he must conform.”12 Felt human experience is the beginning of morality; 
feeling something as good or bad, either from pleasure, pain, or fitness, is what creates the 
potential of morality, but is not morality as such. For example, if our human in moral solitude 
burns her hand on a flame, that action causes pain, she has demands to avoid pain and feel 
pleasure, and therefore she concludes that putting one’s hand into the flame is not good.13 
Burning one’s hand in this manner is a personal ill, but such a claim is not moral per se without 
a standard outside that experience; personal experiences create the potential for morality, not 
morality’s actualization. 
 
10 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 612. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid., 615. For more on pragmatic epistemology, see ch. 3.4. 
13 James makes the case for a “reflex” that children develop as a method to distinguish good and bad based on 
pleasure and pain through an example of a baby who burns her fingers on a candle and habitually avoids future 
burns. See William James, Principles of Psychology Vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1980), 24-5. The 
habitual nature of human activity is explained in ch. 3.2.1. 
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A universe such as ours is nothing like moral solitude. There are billions of human beings 
on earth, all with personal feelings, experiences, and demands. Although every demand is a 
potentially moral one for James, the standard of truthfulness by which one may judge a demand 
can only be found through negotiating with the existence and demands of other human beings. 
Individuals foster the potentiality of morality (felt human experience), and the social realm 
allows for its actualization (including and responding to the impact of activity on other people). 
James explains the profound impact of other minds on morality by adding a second human to 
his hypothetical moral solitude: 
Wherever such minds exist, with judgments of good and ill, and demands upon one another, 
there is an ethical world in its essential features. Were all other things, gods and men and 
starry heavens, blotted out from this universe, and were there left but one rock with two 
loving souls upon it, that rock would have as thoroughly moral a constitution as any possible 
world which the eternities and immensities could harbor. […In that world] there would, in 
short, be a moral life, whose active energy would have no limit but the intensity of interest 
in each other with which the hero and heroine might be endowed. 
We, on this terrestrial globe, so far as the visible facts go, are just like the inhabitants 
of such a rock. Whether a God exist, or whether no God exist, in yon blue heaven above us 
bent, we form at any rate an ethical republic here below.14 
 
Relationality between two humans, human from whom morality originates, allows for the 
formation of an “ethical republic” through dialogue and mediation. With only two humans, 
James states, “there would be real good things and real bad things in the universe; there would 
be obligations, and expectations; obediences, refusals, and disappointments; compunctions and 
longings for harmony to come again, and inward peace of conscience when it is restored.”15 It 
is an empirical fact that all individuals have “unique ideals, requiring cooperation or 
 
14 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 618-19. 
15 Ibid. 
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acquiescence from other individuals for realization,”16 and as such, morality in a world such as 
ours is always social.  
What James is elucidating is that ethics begins in human experience and ends with the 
conflict, mediation, and resolution of different personal moral demands. There are no abstract 
foundations or ideal ends in ethics without particular humans expressing their unique 
experiences—the social nature of reality is morality’s beginning and end. Ethics does not come 
from reason, God, or the mean between excess and deficiency. Instead, ethics comes from 
human beings included in a social world with individual and collective feelings about that which 
is good and bad. These feelings generate practical demands and abstract beliefs and ideals which 
are never independent of individual human beings’ experiences. Ethics is a human and a social 
endeavour.  
 
2.3 Jamesian Morality: Common Sense, its Fallibility, and an Anti-Foundational Prescription 
The thought experiment outlined above is necessary in order to explain the basis of 
Jamesian social ethics, i.e., that the interaction of human beings (rather than an abstract ideals) 
is the source of ethics. In the practical world, ethics is far more advanced than one or two 
individuals in ethical dialogue and conflict. Throughout history, cultures have all settled into 
norms and practices that structure laws, cultural institutions, and internalized ideologies. These 
practices are the lived experience of social ethics which James calls “common sense.”17 
Common sense is a cultural set of beliefs and interests that are accepted (usually uncritically) as 
 
16 Throntveit, “William James’s Ethical Republic,” 259. 
17 William James, “Pragmatism and Common Sense” in The Writings of William James, 420. 
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normal, right, and good both in individual and collective belief systems. Common sense is 
developed and normalized through experiments in past generations that have continuously 
“worked.” As James states,  
our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of exceedingly remote 
ancestors, which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all 
subsequent time. They form one great state of equilibrium in the human mind’s 
development, the stage of common sense.18 
 
The ideologies that make up the common sense of a culture today exist because successful 
experiments from the past have “preserved themselves” through continuing to be successful. 
While James’ point of departure for ethics lies in human beings and their interactions, the 
practical state of ethics is conceived in common sense. Rather than searching for a 
transcendental condition for everyday ethics, James describes common sense as the mechanism 
that creates ethics. When a practice “works,” or is conventionally accepted through time, it adds 
to the stock of norms that define common sense. Rather than searching for an absolutely true 
good or bad, James maps the way that good and bad are historically defined, namely by that 
which is included and excluded in common sense.19  
The truth, according to James, is encompassed in “what works,” or “True ideas are those 
that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.”20 
As such, moral truth is fluid and changes with context, problems, and people; it is based on what 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Cf. James, “Pragmatism and Common Sense.” 
20 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 430. 
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is useful, and utility changes throughout time and through who is included in the designation of 
what works. As James says,  
there is nothing final in any actually given equilibrium of human ideals, […] as our present 
laws and customs have fought and conquered other past ones, so they will in their turn be 
overthrown by any newly discovered order which will hush up the complaints that they still 
give rise to, without producing others louder still.21 
 
This is a central aspect of James’s moral thought: the truths of worlds are fallible; the world is 
unfinished and uncertain. And we, the people inhabiting these societies, are the ones who 
maintain or change moral orders, not toward some pre-existing goal, but towards ends defined 
by human interaction and mediation. But we, whether we are included in the construction of 
common sense or not, are all impacted by the norms of (fallible) common sense. 
For many things, human understanding is successful in its reliance on common sense. But 
common sense makes intuitive a certain worldview which privileges some felt experiences, and 
the ideals that are established on their behalf, above others. Every system of common sense 
excludes some ideals—for better or for worse—by that which stands the tests of time. But 
experiments and ideas that succeed in the past are not necessarily right, they have merely been 
judged triumphant by those already included in the ethical dialogue that maintains common 
sense. For hundreds of years, the experiment in which women could not vote “worked,” but 
only because the common sense of the time excluded the voices of women in the experiment’s 
evaluation.  
 
21 Ibid., 624. 
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This ethical dialogue is ongoing: the ethical equilibrium in the 21st century is not the end of 
ethical growth and discovery, so James instructs us, “Retain, I pray you, this suspicion of 
common sense!”22 Suspicion is warranted because moral norms have never completely 
encompassed every human demand. An ethical republic that fulfils every demand in most cases 
is impossible because many demands fundamentally conflict with others. This is the tragic 
aspect of James’ ethics upon which most scholars agree.23 But more importantly, common sense 
is neither absolute nor final because its categories are only a “collection of extraordinarily 
successful hypotheses”24—hypotheses that have only worked for those included in its 
constitution. 
Therefore, common sense is dangerous because its norms dictate a singular right way to be 
ethical, and it is fallible because it changes throughout time. In fact, common sense blinds us to 
the felt experience of people who do not fit into its paradigm: “Pent in under every system of 
moral rules are innumerable persons whom it weighs upon and goods which it represses; and 
these are always rumbling and grumbling in the background and ready for any issue by which 
they may get free.”25 As James says, the conventional ideology of a society “encourages us not 
to be philosophers but partisans.”26  
James is an anti-foundationalist, or a thinker who rejects a fundamental principle as the 
ground for knowledge. Theories are instruments, rather than answers; James’ method engages 
 
22 Ibid., 428. 
23 Cf. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory (Oxford University Press: 1999), 116; Robert B. Westbrook, Democratic 
Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), esp. 72–73. 
24 James, “Pragmatism and Common Sense,” 428. 
25 Ibid., 624 (emphasis added). 
26 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 622. 
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with a particular anti-intellectualist attitude, or “The attitude of looking away from first things, 
principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and of looking toward last things, fruits, 
consequences, etc.”27 Moral truth cannot be set before an experimental action in the social realm; 
it is only solidified after one sees what the action does in the world. And since the truths of 
common sense change with time and changing societies, there can be no foundation for ethics, 
and no goal towards which such a foundation directs. Ethics is only discovered through 
individual and social practical contexts within the norms of an imperfect and changing common 
sense. And common sense should change, James argues. There are few qualities as vile to James 
as complacency; he says that the highest ethical life “consists at all times in the breaking of rules 
which have grown too narrow for the actual case.” Therefore, the best experiments are those 
that push the boundaries of common sense. 
 
2.4 James’ Ethical Method 
Even though the morality of common sense is worked out in an ethical dialogue through 
history, James’ ethical method explains the way individual and societal action is judged on a 
smaller scale, most notably how to judge one’s own individual actions personally good or bad 
and collective action as collectively good or bad. His ethical method is simple: experiment 
(perform an action), listen to the impacts of said experiment, revise beliefs and actions based on 
the voices to which you listen, and repeat in perpetuum.28 This cycle is the way that everyone 
understands that which is good and bad in their own lives, and the way societies develop the 
 
27 Ibid., 380. 
28 James, “Moral Philosopher.” 
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norms of common sense. James’ ethical method begins with practical experimentation, which 
is synonymous with every action that is ever undertaken; to act is to experiment. In the preface 
to The Will to Believe, James writes that ideals that people believe, practically enacted, “are the 
experimental tests by which they are verified, and the only means by which their truth or 
falsehood can be wrought out.”29 Because there is no tablet on which good and evil is secure, 
activity becomes the plane for moral negotiation. To experiment is to believe in and test a moral 
hypothesis. Because every belief and experiment can be proven wrong (through the following 
step in James’ ethical method), the consequences of actions define the ethical quality of each 
act. Experimenting is what humans do, but there are better and worse ways to experiment, and 
their value can only be judged after the fact. 
Moral experimentation requires literal listening to the results of one’s actions, and this 
listening is the standard by which one can judge whether one’s hypothesis is correct. James says 
that these experiments can only be judged after their enactment, through “how much more 
outcry or how much appeasement comes about.”30 It is through the actual “cries of the 
wounded”31 that one knows if they made a bad mistake. A secluded and emotionless person 
cannot know if they are living a moral life, even if equipped with some categorical imperative 
or abstract commonsensical liberal ideal. The only force that appeals to us, James says, is “found 
in the ‘everlasting ruby vaults’ of our own human hearts, as they happen to beat responsive and 
not irresponsive to the claim [of another].”32 What shows the success or failure of an experiment 
 
29 William James, The Will to Believe and other essays in popular philosophy (New York: Dover, 1956), xii. 
30 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 624. 
31 Ibid., 626. 
32 Ibid., 618. 
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is its impact on people in the world and on the self that one becomes. Humans can ignore 
everything else when they are serving an abstract principle, whether it be utilitarian, 
deontological, liberal, or tyrannical, but when an ethics is based on the human response to one’s 
action, one’s heart will beat differently after a wounded cry. 
The final step in James’ moral system is revision. After an action, and judging its rightness 
or wrongness after the fact, that judgement requires a revision to one’s moral beliefs about the 
ethical republic, about oneself, and most importantly, a revision to future actions. To fail and to 
learn from one’s failure is a virtue, according to James: “We want people who are willing to 
espouse failure as their vocation.”33 If I believe that my action is correct, but after the fact I learn 
that I have failed, I can no longer maintain that belief. As individual beliefs and ideas—based 
on experiences—change throughout history, common sense is revised. Humans always 
experiment and, at least potentially, listen and revise their actions and worldviews, but in most 
situations, individuals come to their own ethical equilibrium which works in their environment. 
Experimentation is the basic mechanism of morality in James’ theory; but humans can do better, 
and if they want to be ethical, they must include and listen to vices outside of their moral 
paradigm. 
 
2.4.1 Pre-Moral Inclusion 
Common sense is the production of everyday humans and every human is conditioned by 
this constructed common sense. It is necessarily exclusive because not everyone’s perspectives 
 
33 William James to Josephine Lowell, Dec. 6, 1903, James Papers (Houghton Library), quoted in Coon, 
Deborah J. “‘One Moment in the World’s Salvation’: Anarchism and the Radicalization of William James,” The 
Journal of American History 83, no. 1 (1996): 91. 
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can be represented, but common sense is always more exclusive than it could be. While 
everyone has desires that cannot both be satisfied in a personal or collective common sense 
because they are inherently self-contradictory, such as “spending our money yet growing rich; 
taking our holiday yet getting ahead with our work; shooting and fishing yet doing no hurt to 
the beasts,”34 there is a plethora of perspectives that are not necessarily contradictory within 
common sense but are still excluded, or “repressed” as James states. The reason for this 
exclusion is a practical question to be taken up in chapter four, but that the exclusion exists is a 
problem for James’ ethical method because voices excluded from common sense are not part of 
the feedback loop that revises common sense. And because common sense dictates even the 
lives of those excluded from impacting it, common sense has dictatorial qualities. It impacts 
everyone in a society but is constructed only by those already inside of it, i.e. those with 
institutional influence and power. As James says, under every system of moral rules are 
“innumerable persons whom it weighs upon and goods which it represses.”35 These people and 
goods can “get free,” i.e. become part of common sense, but first, the voices of repressed people 
need to be included in the ethical dialogue that creates common sense. Inclusion in collective 
common sense precedes a representative (or democratic) common sense. And until all voices 
are included in the ongoing ethical dialogue in a society, the norms of common sense will be 
dictated only by those with the privilege of not being repressed—in particular those with 
conventional power, status, and wealth. 
 
34 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 621. 
35 Ibid., 624. 
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The Jamesian solution to the exclusive nature of common sense is radical inclusion, i.e., to 
include as many voices as possible in the ethical dialogue in order to create the conditions for a 
social ethics that accurately represents the perspectives of the social; as he proclaims, “Since 
victory and defeat there must be, the victory to be philosophically prayed for is that of the more 
inclusive side.”36 Ethics is an experimental, methodological process (act, listen, revise), and 
while actions and revisions are individually enacted, listening requires the inclusion of other 
people in an individual or collective paradigm. To make a common sense that accurately reflects 
the felt human experiences of people in a population, everyone’s voice—not just those who fit 
into the current paradigm (repressive common sense)—must be included. Inclusion as the 
necessary precondition to ethics is a simple yet profound point at the core of what James adds 
to moral philosophy.  
In order to clarify the anti-transcendental nature of James’ perspective, I call the foundation 
of Jamesian ethics “pre-moral inclusion” because ethics requires the inclusion human voices, 
and an ethics that resists totalitarianism requires expanding the number of voices included in 
common sense.37 The alternative to pre-moral inclusion, i.e. the status quo, is an oligarchical 
ethical order dictated by those with power and influence. Pre-moral inclusion is the condition 
for ethics, not a transcendental ideal such as freedom and equality, because it does not state that 
any particular ideal is better than others and has neither a supernatural ground nor idealized end, 
it merely elevates the experiences of every person in the society in which ideals are debated, 
enacted, and normalized.  
 
36 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 623. 
37 The basis for pre-moral inclusion is fundamentally democratic. Cf. ch 4. 
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A legitimate objection against pre-moral inclusion could be argued as follows: “James 
condemns ideal abstractions as the basis for morality, so what distinguishes freedom and 
equality from inclusion? Inclusion sounds like another abstraction.” If inclusion is an a priori 
principle, James’ anti-foundationalism falls apart. But inclusion is drastically different than 
freedom and equality. Inclusion is not (first) a human ideal, it is the practical condition for the 
creation of human ideals. It is not an a priori ethical principle, but that which precedes and 
ultimately maximizes the possibility of ethics. Inclusion is not the core of an ethical ideology or 
political philosophy, but the practical condition for ethical ideology. Pre-moral inclusion is prior 
to every ethical debate. Without inclusion, there is no ethics, and without maximum inclusion, 
common sense—i.e. the status quo—cannot reflect the moral demands of a culture. Inclusion 
has the capacity to transcend the dualism of ethical ideologies, in particular the debate between 
liberalism and socialism:38 On this reading, liberalism and socialism are incommensurable 
because they have different points of departure, namely equity and equality respectively, so 
debates between these schools of thought go on without resolution or productivity ad infinitum. 
As an alternative, pre-moral inclusion rejects an abstract foundational principle of morality and 
gives the authority of defining good and bad to an actual ethical republic and the necessary 
social dialogues within it.   
James is a master of overcoming dualisms between incompatible philosophies. He argues 
that pragmatism provides a method to transcend the following philosophical problems: the one 
 
38 For an overview of the deep conflicts between liberalism and socialism, see James Alexander, “The Major 
Ideologies of Liberalism, Socialism and Conservatism,” Political Studies 63, no. 5 (2014): 980–994. 
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and the many, freedom and determinism, materialism and spiritualism, optimism and 
pessimism, and more.39 In each of these cases, James examines the practical implications of 
each theory if that theory is true and finds a third way to overcome their deficiencies. In the 
same way, Jamesian pre-moral inclusion transcends the divide in academic and political debate 
by prioritizing the practical importance of inclusion. The divisions of political philosophy are 
insignificant as long as there are actual voices being repressed by the status quo. Without every 
perspective represented in the mechanisms that create and maintain common sense, individual 
philosophers cannot seek an absolute principle that is the basis of ethics. They can either assume 
that their perspectives are absolutely good (which seems close to the experience of Jamesian 
“moral solitude”) or advocate for the practical expansion of the condition of ethics, namely 
inclusion, and participate and listen to the ethical dialogue that ensues. 
Pre-moral inclusion first starts with human beings with practical experiences in the world, 
feeling things as good and bad, and making demands that require the response of others. This 
directly negates the possibility of abstract moral standards that precede actual human 
experience. Second, in the social realm different moral demands are mediated through a myriad 
of ways—including public opinion, politics, and generally, moral dialogue—that settle into an 
equilibrium of normalcy called common sense, which typically guides most of human action. 
There are different instances of personal interpretation and exercise of common senses based on 
social group, geography, and history. Because common sense, like all truth, is fallible and 
 
39 Cf. William James, Pragmatism (New York: Dover Publications, 1995). 
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represses some voices, when individuals and communities act, their actions are not always 
already either good or bad, in fact, every action is an experiment.  
The experimentation process is the third aspect of pre-moral inclusion. Experiments succeed 
or fail in the practical world, and the only way to judge an experiment is through listening to 
other people about the impact that one’s action has on them. This requires listening and revisions 
to our perspectives and ultimately, revising common sense. But the experimentation process 
cannot adequately fall into an ethical equilibrium without the inclusion of as many people as 
possible. Therefore, inclusion is a prerequisite to any robust moral system. Before one can be 
moral, there must be other people, and a moral common sense requires as many people as 
possible—radical inclusion if possible—in a moral universe. The maximum quality of morality 
for individuals, and common sense for collectives, comes from the inclusion of the maximum 
number of voices and perspectives in a moral sphere.  
Radical inclusion is the experimental or social end (not ideal or transcendental) of pre-moral 
inclusion, but such inclusion requires qualification. Radical inclusion means an inclusion of 
every individual, not every perspective. Trygve Throntveit shares this interpretation of James. 
When James says the victory to be “prayed for” is the “more inclusive side,” Throntveit argues, 
“it was people, not ideals, on whose behalf he pleaded.”40 This is because (based on felt human 
evidence) not all demands are equal; moral inclusion is not merely about fulfilling the highest 
number of demands. The quality of demands is also considered.41 All people should be included 
 
40 Trygve Throntviet, “William James’s Ethical Republic.” Journal of the History of Ideas 72 (2011): 270. 
41 See James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 613, wherein James argues that it would be a “hideous thing” to accept a 
“utopia” in which millions are kept permanently happy on the condition that one person “on the far-off edge of 
things should lead a life of lonely torture.” As such, he distances himself from pure utilitarian (or majoritarian) 
calculations about happiness and demand-satisfaction. 
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in the ethical dialogue, but some perspectives need to be restricted, namely hate speech, i.e. that 
which undermines the practical (pre-moral) requirement of ethics: every human demand has 
potentially-moral quality. As James says, “The practical consequence of such a philosophy is 
the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality,—is, at any rate, the 
outward tolerance of whatever is not itself intolerant.42 Therefore, radical inclusion means the 
inclusion of every human, but not every perspective; intolerant, exclusive hate speech is not part 
of pre-moral inclusion.43  
 
2.4.2 James’ Individual Morality 
Philosophers, James says, “cannot rule out any ideal from being heard” and should vote 
always for the good which seems “most apt to be a member of a more inclusive whole.”44 This 
means that individuals ought to seek out new and diverse perspectives and always be open to 
revision based on these viewpoints. In his text, “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” 
James explains that without an “intensity of interest,” humans are often blind to what is 
meaningful to others. He famously explains this through a personal anecdote. While journeying 
in the mountains of North Carolina, James passes what he calls “coves” where settlers built log 
cabins and kept small farms. Upon seeing theses, James says “the impression on my mind was 
one of unmitigated squalor,” and that “No modern person ought to be willing to live a day in 
 
42 William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1899), v. 
43 Cf. ch. 4.6. 
44 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 622, 626. 
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such a state of rudimentariness and denudation.”45 But when he asked his driver, a mountaineer, 
what sort of people would live in such a way, the mountaineer responded, “All of us, […] Why, 
we ain’t happy here, unless we are getting one of these coves under cultivation.”46 Through the 
eyes of a Cambridge academic, James confesses, “the clearing, which to me was a mere ugly 
picture on the retina, [but the clearing] was to them a symbol redolent with moral memories and 
sang a very pæan of duty, struggle, and success.”47  
James was blind to the meaning of these coves to mountain settlers, he did not include their 
perspectives in his personal moral order, and how could he? Before listening to his mountaineer 
companion, he had fallen into a common human trait: humans feel their own duties and feelings 
as immediately and intensely significant, and often cannot see and do not listen to that which is 
meaningful, or moral, to others. We need others to support our moral demands, and often, in the 
same way we are blind to others’ perspectives; James writes,  
others are too much absorbed in their own vital secrets to take an interest in ours. Hence the 
stupidity and injustice of our opinions, so far as they deal with the significance of alien 
lives. Hence the falsity of our judgments, so far as they presume to decide in an absolute  
way on the value of other persons’ conditions or ideals.48 
Without including the plurality of voices, moral perspectives, and felt experiences of others, 
individuals are destined to have erroneous opinions and faulty judgements. Because common 
sense, and therefore, moral truth changes with people, context, and culture, the only way to best 
grasp the totality of competing truths is through constantly expanding one’s moral universe. 
And this expansion only occurs through including and listening to as many voices as possible. 
 
45 James, “On a Certain Blindness,” 630, 631. 
46 Ibid., 631. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 629-30 
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2.4.3 James’ Societal Ethics 
The central problem of any moral life is that not all voices are actively heard; individuals 
cannot include every voice in their worldview. They can seek out new and different perspectives 
through dialogue, literature, and research, but one person cannot expect to understand every 
single ideology in any culture. This is where the personal prescription expands to the societal. 
An individual requires other voices to have any standard of ethics, and if he or she seeks to be 
an ethical person, he or she ought to perpetually expand one’s conception of the plurality of 
perspectives and voices. In the same way, an ethical republic comes into existence through the 
interaction of various human demands, which come from felt experiences, and in order to be a 
better ethical republic, with a common sense that reflects the people it impacts, that society 
ought to expand its moral boundaries as much as possible. Unlike individual humans, collectives 
can include all of their members’ voices in decision-making. The decision-making process that 
is (in theory) governed by all its constituents is called democracy. Everyone can partake and 
communicate in the process of ethical deliberation and decision-making in a democracy. And if 
a society truly follows the decision-making processes of an ideal democracy and includes 
everyone in ethical deliberations, the common sense will adequately reflect that society’s 
perspectives and demands. 
In the West, of course, the largest venue in which collective ethical rulings are made is in 
the political arena. Politicians literally write the rules around what is good and bad. Through 
legislation, regulation, and initiatives, national, provincial, and municipal governments make 
large-scale rulings on what is acceptable in society. These governments have the capacity to 
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change common sense; for example, when the US government, through the supreme court, ruled 
that gay marriage was legal, that which was acceptable changed. But the formal political arena 
is not the only way that ethics are decided. Arguably, common sense around gay marriage had 
been changing for decades because the LGBTQ+ community was heard in informal social 
settings, and thus the governments unequivocal legalisation followed, rather than changed, 
common sense. I do not seek to settle this debate here; what is important is that there are more 
actors in the process of revising common sense than solely the government. The legitimization 
of common sense is a socio-political activity. Sites of employment, unions, social movements, 
clubs, religious organizations, neighbourhood associations, schools, and families all contribute 
to the norms about good and bad. Each of these groups maintain and perpetuate certain norms 
and practices through what is accepted as normal and through the vision, focus, and perspectives 
represented within them.  
But common sense can also be changed through changing that which is common within 
these smaller associations. Families with gay children can either cast them out or reform their 
worldviews. Schools with new refugees can either reject or embrace these children, and in so 
doing, revise their ideologies. Neighbourhood and religious organizations can maintain the 
status quo through discriminatory requirements for entry or change because of encounters with 
new people. And workplaces can either ignore women who complain about sexual harassment 
and unfair treatment or listen to and believe women and change their norms and practices. Each 
of these choices is between maintaining a repressive status quo—contemporary common 
sense—and revising their ideologies based on encounters with human beings. And these 
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revisions spread, sometimes all the way to the law, economics, politics, and generally, a revised 
common sense. 
 
2.5 The Critique of Van Parijs’ Abstract Foundations 
Thus far, I explained James’ argument that morality begins and ends in human experience 
rather than absolutist or transcendental ideals; the source of moral beliefs and norms is felt, not 
intellectualized. I then showed the structure of this moral methodology, namely its anti-
transcendental and fallible foundation in common sense, which is a constructed social sense of 
right and wrong based on that which “works” throughout time. The judgement of “what works” 
is made by the voices included in common sense, but there are many voices excluded from 
common sense with perspectives different from the included ideals. I explained that when more 
voices are included, common sense becomes more democratic and representative of the 
populace it governs and that when it is more exclusive it becomes more dictatorial and 
oligarchical. I then explained James’ ethical method on individual and collective levels, namely 
experimentation, listening, and revising those experiments and beliefs. And I showed that 
inclusion, or pre-moral inclusion, precedes an ethical ideology because to use any common 
sense that is exclusive will always be less representative, and more oligarchical, than an 
absolutely inclusive common sense. As such, inclusion precedes ethics. 
In the first chapter, I explained that the foundation for Van Parijs’ BI argument is in the 
abstract ideals of freedom and equality. These are unquestioned, absolutist goods in Van Parijs’ 
argument. Van Parijs’ BI argument is not connected to human experience or demand at all. 
Instead of starting ethics in human experience, Van Parijs bases his ethical argument in two 
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liberal abstractions which are good irrespective of context or individual and community 
perspectives. But as I have shown, in conjunction with James’ theory of the moral life, abstract 
principles are rendered good by people in particular circumstances within a particular historical 
and cultural common sense. The liberal belief that freedom and equality are the basis for ethical 
philosophy is merely a felt experience, one—if a prevalent one—amongst billions of human 
ideals. As James points out, “The sense for abstract justice which some persons have is as 
eccentric a variation, from the natural-history point of view, as is the passion for music or for 
the higher philosophical consistencies which consumes the soul of others.”49 Since believing in 
a moral ideal propounds a particular conception of the good life, Van Parijs contradicts himself 
when he claims that “what counts as a just society should not be determined on the basis of 
some particular conception of the good life.”50 His conception of the good life is the basis for 
his “ideal society,” i.e. real freedom for all. Van Parijs bases his ethical defence of BI in a 
specific conception of common sense, namely liberal individualism. Pre-moral inclusion, on the 
other hand, does not presume a correct moral ideology. Instead it is an unavoidable condition 
that acknowledges the human source of ideology and trusts that, if everyone is included in the 
discussion of good and bad, common sense will reflect that which is good and bad for everyone. 
Van Parijs’ ethical argument is based on a group of particular moral ideals that does not 
and cannot encompass all moral perspectives. It shrinks before the vast moral universe of ideals 
and feelings. His approach to a just society encapsulates what David Rondel calls “‘ideal-
 
49 Ibid., 612-3. 
50 Van Paris, Real Freedom, 28. 
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theoretical’ first principles” wherein “one first discovers the correct moral principles (a purely 
‘normative’ enterprise) and then asks how they may be applied to this or that context.”51 As I 
have expressed, there are no correct moral principles without radical inclusion, merely exclusive 
ideologies dominated by powerful peoples’ perspectives. Common sense dictates that which is 
good and bad in a society for everyone, but not everyone is included in the constitution of 
common sense; therefore from a Jamesian perspective, everyone should be included in the 
decision-making processes which create the norms of common sense.  
In contemporary Western cultures, some voices do not matter (or have no influence), and 
this is antithetical to James’ theory. Even though America, the “land of the free,” is a country 
heralded for its belief in the abstraction of freedom, many people are not included in this 
freedom. Although people excluded from influence on common sense still realize moral ideas 
and make moral demands, their voices do not impact the common sense. There are practical 
prerequisites for freedom, including wealth, education, status, and free time, or generally, 
inclusion in the decision-making processes that determine common sense. Without inclusion, 
the social norms that govern ethics, values, and ideologies work for some (especially people 
instrumental in the norms’ maintenance) but are not the best norms for everyone. For example, 
homelessness and poverty are tolerated because the voices of the homeless and the poor are 
excluded from the ethical dialogue, and therefore from the norms of common sense.52 The 
overall perspective of James’ ethical theory is that the morality of common sense grows with 
the number of voices included in it, because it is through people, and nothing else, that demands 
 
51 David Rondel, Pragmatist Egalitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 8. 
52 Cf. ch. 4.3. 
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are validated and normalized. Only through a process of inclusion can a better universe be 
attained. And for the time being, people who are excluded from the status quo are impacted by 
a system of norms that do not reflect their demands. Inclusion, not freedom, is the beginning 
(and end, as will become clear in future chapters) of ethics. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
It may not be controversial that freedom and equality are worthy ideals, but to base a moral 
system on any abstract ideal ignores the way that morals function. Morality is not based in first 
principles but is the consequence of human experience and human experiment in the world. But 
some perspectives are more influential than others; common sense embraces some voices and 
represses others. Morality cannot and should not remain fixed and rigid. Morals are a part of a 
common sense that is fallible, and therefore the possibility of defining a system on the back of 
two abstract moral ideals—ideals that are fixed, static, and not amenable to experimentation—
is impossible and disconnected with the real activity of human moral development and the 
demands of an ethical common sense. Van Parijs’ foundation for BI caters to the current way 
he (and classical liberalism) sees good and bad, rather than something that is necessary for a 
more accurate formation of good and bad. It is both presumptuous and incorrect to believe that 
one has found the best ethical ideals that will ever exist. Humility in the face of billions of moral 
perspectives, rather than certainty in a particular position, is what is missing in Van Parijs’ 
account. Instead of assuming that humanity has reached its ethical apex, I argue that 
philosophers ought to take a step back and trust that, through including the voices repressed by 
the weight of contemporary common sense, our culture will inevitably become a better one with 
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fresh ideas, new perspectives, and unique viewpoints that Western thinkers, a group in which I 
include myself, cannot envision.  
The case for BI requires a conception of morality as a consequence of human life, not one 
that precedes it, and a structural understanding of social ethics as the production of whatever 
group has influence on it. This chapter explained how William James’ pre-moral prescription of 
inclusivity better explains the process of ethical deliberation and the ways that his anti-
foundational foundation is a better basis for BI than Van Parijs’ ideals. Since the origin of 
morality and the mediation of common sense is solely found within the realm of felt human 
experience, abstract ideals formulated in a particular context cannot be the basis for an ethical 
argument. Van Parijs is biased towards a particular perspective and contradicts his neutrality 
principle. But this perspective is only one in an ethical republic of billions, and as James states, 
the task for a philosopher is to study the ideals and practices existing in the world, and at the 
outset of his inquiry, “he ought to have no other ideals.”53 Van Parijs justifies his BI because, 
he claims, freedom and equality are abstract ideals, good in all circumstances. In order to 
discover the justification for BI, we must look at the ethical republic without the bias of our 
ideals and advocate for the creation of the conditions for a broader scope of ethical mediation 
and deliberation. Only inclusion of many and different voices in the process of ethical dialogue 
creates the possibility for an ethical republic.
 
53 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 611. 
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Chapter Three: Critiquing Van Parijs: The Self and the Value of Activity 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter two I explained through an investigation of William James’ social ethics that 
inclusion is a stronger foundation for ethical philosophy than Philippe Van Parijs’ liberal and 
abstract principle of freedom. James argues that ethics originate in human experience and 
become entrenched through a politico-socio-ethical dialogue in which ethics are akin to 
scientific experiments. When an action has positive consequences, i.e., when the voices of other 
people appraise such consequences, that action “works” in a Jamesian sense, and is perpetuated 
until the voices of other humans reject that action, at which point such an action (and belief in 
that action) requires revision. The problem with such a moral system is that not everyone in a 
society has the same influence on the ethical dialogue that structures their social ethics, in fact, 
many people have little to no influence. As such, I extended James’ social ethics to its 
experimental conclusion, namely that inclusion precedes ethical dialogue as such because 
human reaction is the standard by which one knows if an action is good or bad. And because 
common sense—the culmination of a vast number of human experiments and human responses 
to said experiments—influences and controls that which is good and bad for everyone, everyone 
should be included in the ethical dialogue (radical inclusion) in order to create democratic, rather 
than dictatorial or oligarchical, social ethics.  
“Pre-moral inclusion,” what I call the Jamesian ethical account, is a better philosophical 
ideology than the liberalism of Van Parijs because morality is not prescribed by philosophers. 
Van Parijs advocates for an ethical philosophy that posits freedom and (relative) equality as 
goals worthy of striving towards without and beyond justification, as necessary goods, but James 
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shows that norms in common sense such as freedom are the result of repressive and exclusive 
ethical dialogues, and instead of advocating for an ethics based on contemporary norms, I argue 
that inclusion is the practical prerequisite to a representative social ethics. Abstract ideals 
remove the human being from the actual experience of ethical experimentation and posit 
particular perspectives as the absolutely good and right ones. James shows why philosophers 
need humility—a philosopher’s perspective is merely one of billions, and all perspectives have 
moral content that should be included in the ethical republic. 
This chapter further develops the argument that Van Parijs’ BI justification is unacceptable 
for two reasons, both of which reflect his classical liberal foundation. First, Van Parijs’ 
conception of the self is based in an individualism that is limited and embraces the repressive 
status quo as is evident in his argument that the value of traits can be defined based on current 
preferences (without reference to structural reasons for such preferences). Second, Van Parijs’ 
definition of valuable human activity is capitalistic and ignores “non-productive” labour because 
his philosophy of inheritance, that which defines what is valuable throughout time, does not 
account for unwaged activity.  
Classical liberal economists have theorized an individual independent from society for 
hundreds of years; as John Stuart Mill claims, “Human beings in society have no properties but 
those which are derived from, and which may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of 
individual men.”1 The whole is always dependent on the attributes of the parts, according to 
 
1 John Stuart Mill, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1963), 879; cf. Jeremy Bentham: Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, eds. J. H. Burns and 
H. L. A. Hart (London: Athlone Press, 1970). 
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classical liberalism, and Van Parijs utilizes this sort of self in his argument for BI. I will argue 
that Van Parijs’ classical liberal conception of selfhood presupposes an isolated, economic 
individual that is inconsistent with the welfare reforms for which Van Parijs advocates. This 
form of individualism suggests that individuals are disconnected from the social experience of 
selfhood and further, responsible for their own poverty because choices are based in innate 
preferences, rather than in systems of societal power. I will counter these aspects of Van Parijs’ 
individualism with William James’ psychology and philosophy. James argues that (social) habit 
is the primary basis of action, rather than inherent individual preferences; he defends an 
expansive sense of the self which shows the limits of Van Parijs’ homo economicus; and James’ 
structural and fallible common sense demonstrates Van Parijs’ bias toward contemporary 
norms. To punctuate James’ point, I will use disability studies as an example that shows the 
social and marginalizing nature of the status quo’s common sense. 
The second problem with Van Parijs’ philosophical worldview is his conception of value, 
which is clearest in his defence against the “free-rider” objection, i.e., that it is unfair that people 
receive a BI if they do not work. Van Parijs argues that BI is just because the value of historical 
inheritance creates the ability to hold jobs or (depending on the year in which Van Parijs writes) 
make high incomes. The structural forces that created the ability to have wealth and work for 
which no one today worked is the definition of inheritance for Van Parijs. Currently, he claims, 
this inheritance is distributed unequally through incomes, in which the wealthy have salaries 
that include a vast amount of inheritance and the poor have wages that contain much less. Van 
Parijs argues that everyone should be equally endowed with this inheritance because it is a 
collective inheritance to which no one particularly entitled and therefore BI is the solution 
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because it can distribute this inheritance. But I will demonstrate that Van Parijs’ argument 
results in a philosophy in which the only activity that can be described as valuable is activity 
that has economic consequences. The Jamesian alternative I provide is again based in common 
sense: common sense is the measure of value, all activity is involved in the production of 
common sense, and therefore all activity is valuable. A great deal of the actual norms and 
practices in common sense cannot be constrained to economic consequences, and the outcome 
of Van Parijs’ argument, I demonstrate, is that the actions without economic consequences are 
worthless. To conclude, I posit a Jamesian defence of an obligation-free BI, namely that it 
distributes resources that creates the conditions for any and all activity, which is inherently 
valuable to the creation and maintenance of common sense. Irrespective of employment status, 
people should be included in the ethical dialogue that creates common sense, and every form of 
activity impacts common sense. To sum up, this chapter shows that Van Parijs’ philosophy has 
unreconcilable problems, namely in the realms of individualism and non-economic activity, and 
that it requires amendments that James can provide. 
 
3.2 Van Parijs’ Individualism and its Deficiencies 
Van Parijs understands the self is an aggregate of traits, namely talents, acquired through 
“nature or upbringing,”2 individual tastes or preferences, and the choices that these preferences 
generate. He admits talents are both natural and social, but does not acknowledge the same for 
taste (or preference). Every mention of “self” and “individual” in Van Parijs’ Real Freedom is 
 
2 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 61. 
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framed in language of freedom, ownership, self-interest, self-respect, employment, individual 
choices, and individual preferences.3 He never establishes a philosophy of why individuals have 
the preferences they do. Preferences merely appear as part of a human constitution. This 
component of Van Parijs’ philosophy of self is deeply problematic but is a good example of the 
way that his liberal bias seeps into his argument for BI. 
Another aspect of the Van Parijs individualism is the way that individual traits are 
designated as good or bad. This designation is a social process, but a short-sighted and purely 
majoritarian one: if the majority currently believes a trait is good, then it is good. The utilitarian 
valuation of traits is clearly exhibited in Van Parijs’ argument for “undominated diversity.” Van 
Parijs acknowledges that “some people have serious handicaps relative to others” and that 
justice “requires compensation for unequal internal endowments.”4 Internal endowments are 
another term that means “talents.” The way that Van Parijs defends that people with “serious 
handicaps” require compensation is through the idea of “undominated diversity;” that 
distribution in a society is unjust “as long as there are two people such that everyone in the 
society concerned prefers the whole endowment (both internal and external) of one of them to 
that of the other.”5 When everyone in a society agrees that one person has preferable traits 
compared to a second person, there is “dominated diversity.” And “undominated diversity” 
exists when no person in a society has internal (talents) and external (income) endowments 
preferable to another’s. In other words, people with “bad” traits, i.e. talents plus income, should 
 
3 The only exception to this rule is when Van Parijs writes that “no human individual could reach adulthood in 
the absence of innumerable goods and services she is treated to throughout her childhood” (Van Parijs, Real 
Freedom, 103). Otherwise, there is no philosophy of selfhood beyond an assumed liberal individualism. 
4 Ibid., 58. 
5 Ibid., 59; cf. ch. 1.2. 
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be given extra compensation through BI. This majoritarian valuation based in status-quo 
morality is the standard by which Van Parijs measures good and bad traits. 
Van Parijs argues that everyone values (or has a preference for) that which is conventionally 
accepted as “ability:” “there are general talents (say, sight) everyone firmly values, whether or 
not one possesses them.”6 And as such, Van Parijs argues that people with physical or mental 
disabilities require a higher BI. The internal endowments, or talents, plus external endowments, 
or the increased BI, of persons with disabilities would then be more preferable to some in society 
than an able body with the regular BI (based on a conception of the good life where income is 
the most important). As long as one person prefers the whole endowment of a deaf or blind 
person, then undominated diversity is attained.7 Van Parijs posits that some talents are 
(de)valued by everyone, and in particular, talents associated with disability, and undominated 
diversity solves this problem. Therefore, not only are preferences individual rather than social, 
but their ethical quality is based in 1) the morality of the status quo and 2) absolute human 
preferences.  
The final trait of individuals (after social talents and individual preferences) is the choice 
that results from preferences. Individual preferences and tastes have consequences, which 
according to Van Parijs are the sole responsibility of the individual: “people must bear the 
consequences of the preferences or tastes they have on their level of welfare or preference 
 
6 Ibid., 69. 
7 This extra allocation cannot be so high that everyone in a society would reasonably prefer the endowments of a 
person with disability to another’s endowment, merely that not everyone would prefer the combination of internal 
and external endowments in all respects of one person compared to another. See ch. 1; Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 
ch. 3. 
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satisfaction.”8 Preferences or tastes are what motivate people to act; action is the rational end of 
taste, and therefore, actions are an individual’s full responsibility. As Van Parijs states, “I have 
no objection to people ending up with different amounts of compensation as a result of 
differences in the actual choices they make on the basis of their tastes.”9 Therefore, since 
individual taste has no structural explanation, neither does action. 
Van Parijs’ conception of self views individuals as connected to a broader society only as 
the source of utilitarian moral decision-making. His understanding of the individual is primarily 
an isolated one who enacts inherent preferences, and as such, I conclude that Van Parijs’ 
individualism is based in to classical liberalism, wherein individuals precede society, have inner 
preferences that impact society, but are not impacted by society.10 Of course, this conclusion is 
based in the fact that Van Parijs is missing an explanation of the ways in which individuals 
develop or acquire habits. I acknowledge the difficulties surrounding any attempt to prove a 
negative, but this chapter seeks to unpack the implicit philosophy and biases of Van Parijs, and 
different examples of ways he writes about the human being and about activates that have value 
is evidence that his liberal biases render aspects of his philosophy insufficient. His lack of 
engagement with human selfhood on a structural level and lack of critical evaluation of social 
inheritance are problems that William James and the pre-moral inclusion explained in chapter 
two can help rectify.  
 
 
8 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 50. 
9 Ibid., 59. 
10 Other scholars have acknowledged this individualism in Van Parijs texts, cf. Leticia Morales, “The Democratic 
Case for a Basic Income,” Law, Ethics, and Philosophy 6 (2018). 
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3.2.1 The Responsibility of Poverty 
The first outcome of Van Parijs’ individualism is that Van Parijs’ conception of the self as 
a taste-based actor who is responsible for his or her tastes and actions has dire consequences for 
people in poverty. The likely hypothesis that results from an essentialist understanding about 
human preferences and action is that if someone is poor, their condition is their responsibility; 
Van Parijs’ conception of the self has the likely consequence that poverty is a personal failure. 
Van Parijs never says this and would reject the claim that his individualism results in entirely 
blaming those in poverty for their situations, but by exclusively writing about the human as an 
isolated individual with inherent preferences and ignoring the social mechanisms that help 
fabricate the self and its situation, his texts lend themselves to a reading in which people are 
born with the preferences that determine their economic outcomes. Such a reading excludes 
other factors that contribute to poverty such as systemic failures, generations of discrimination, 
and trauma.  
A popular quote from contemporary historian and BI advocate Rutger Bregman is that 
“poverty is not a lack of character, but a lack of cash.”11 In his most recent text, Bregman draws 
upon a breadth of sociological, historical, and anthropological research to proves that poverty is 
not a personal failure. An example of such research is Anandi et al.’s examination of cognitive 
function among Indian farmers before and after their harvest, which corresponds to relative 
poverty and affluence respectively. The same farmers show diminished cognitive performance 
before the harvest—on average 14 points of IQ—compared to after the harvest. This 
 
11 Rutger Bregman, Utopia for Realists: How We Can Build the Ideal World (New York: Little, Brown and 
Company, 2017). 
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phenomenon is called the “scarcity mindset,” in which people in poverty are unable to make 
long-term decisions because of short-term crises. This study, along many other examples of 
similar empirical research, suggests that poverty is not inherent to a person’s biology or 
selfhood, but is tied to larger systems that make poverty nearly impossible to escape.12  
Resistance to placing the whole responsibility of activity and one’s social situation on the 
individual is a core aspect to Jamesian social ethics. In James’ psychological works, he calls the 
human tendency to follow particular patterns habit, which, beyond physical patterns, best 
explains “such functions as the associations of ideas, perception, memory, reasoning, the 
education of the will, etc., etc.”13 Echoing Aristotle’s maxim that excellence is not merely an 
act, but a habit, James says that habit is the “enormous fly-wheel of society,” or that which 
“keeps us all within the boundaries of ordinance.”14 Humans learn to live, think, and act 
according to the world they inhabit. We acquire habits about what is good, bad, preferable, and 
pathological.15 Therefore, when people are born into an impoverished household, their habits 
(and physiology) develop differently than those who grow up in a wealthy home. Being born in 
a particular social and cultural context is not the fault of the person in poverty, but the fault of a 
socio-economic system that tolerates such desperate forms of poverty. As such, a foundational 
 
12 Anandi Mani, et al. “Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function” Science 341, no. 6149 (2013), 976-80. Cf. Simon 
Pemberton, Eldin Fahmy, Eileen Sutton, and Karen Bell, “Navigating the Stigmatised Identities of Poverty in 
Austere Times: Resisting and Responding to Narratives of Personal Failure,” Critical Social Policy 36, no. 1 
(2016); David Farrugia and Jessica Gerrard, “Academic Knowledge and Contemporary Poverty: The Politics of 
Homelessness Research,” Sociology 50, no. 2 (April 2016). 
13 William James, “Habit,” in The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. J. McDermott 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 9. 
14 Ibid., 16. 
15 Even Jamesian temperament, fundamental to the character of a person, comes from physiology and 
psychology, and is not free of social forces. See Francesca Bordogna, “The Psychology and Physiology of 
Temperament: Pragmatism in Context,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 37(1), 2001, 21. 
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philosophy that ignores that all activity, and in particular, poverty, is not the exclusive fault of 
individuals—as does the liberal individualism of Van Parijs—is indefensible, while the social 
ethics of James can better explain the human phenomenon of poverty as a product of personal, 
social, and cultural habits.  
 
3.2.2 The Critique of Homo Economicus: James’ Understanding of Self 
Van Parijs’ individualism, although never fully developed, is liberal in its assessment of the 
human self as a homo economicus, or economic man, a term that originates in John Stewart 
Mill’s work on political economy.16 This type of individualism conceives of the self as a pre-
formed being, exclusively personal, which always acts in a rational, tastes-based manner. A few 
examples of the liberal homo economicus in Van Parijs’ works are found in the ways he justifies 
BI theoretically. He puts three (liberal) thinkers into conversation in order to see the best way 
to justify why BI is good for everyone. They are John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and John 
Roemer, who all use rational, individual preference as the basis for political policy. If a homo 
economicus behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance—or in similar thought experiment such as 
Dworkin’s insurance scheme or Roemer’s exploitation—would vote to put a BI in place, then it 
is good.17 Further, Van Parijs only speaks about humans in the abstract, whether in terms of 
human capital, labour, or dignity18 and does not include the complex and messy character of 
human beings that everyone encounters in the actually experienced world. Beyond colloquial 
 
16 John Stuart Mill, “On the Definition of Political Economy, and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It,” in 
Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, 
1874). 
17 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, ch. 3-5. 
18 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 39, 46, 96. 
Chapter Three 
 62 
human encounters, empirical research shows the homo economicus is mythological; in many 
traditional societies, anthropologists find that individual choices are based in reciprocity, not 
rational self-interest,19 and many economists in the field of behavioural economics have 
demonstrated that people often do not act according to rational, self-interested calculations.20  
Therefore, relying on a homo economicus as a foundational part of a social philosophy 
opens Van Parijs to significant criticism. William James can succinctly make this criticism 
because he grapples with the question Van Parijs ignores: from where do individual preferences 
originate? James’ understanding of the self is wide and complex, and it solves the problems 
outlined above; in brief, “a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he can call his.”21 There are 
many constituents of the self according to James, notably the material, the social, and the 
spiritual.22 The material self is made of the body, clothing, immediate family, property such as 
a home, and material made through one’s labour. The social self is the recognition one gets from 
his or her friends: “Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals 
who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his 
images is to wound him.”23 Van Parijs’ individualist self is closest to the James’ spiritual self, 
in which psychic faculties correspond to talents and dispositions are similar to tastes. Virtually 
 
19 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1972). 
20 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of 
Uncertainty” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 no. 4 (1992): 297–323; Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, 
Cass, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008). 
21 William James, Principles of Psychology Vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1980), 291. 
22 The fourth aspect of James’ self is called the “pure ego,” i.e., that which provides the thread of continuity 
between our past, present, and future selves. See James, Principles, 296. 
23 Ibid., 294. 
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no one argues that there is no personal aspect of the self; what James shows is that the personal 
self is never independent from the material and social. Humans always know themselves in a 
personal, social, and cultural world.  
And the socio-cultural aspects of the self are connected to James’ “common sense;”24 the 
ethical equilibrium established by “what works” throughout human history and that which 
culturally defines social ethics through norms, laws, and habits. While Van Parijs relies on a 
homo economicus throughout his text, James argues that the human self is much richer than a 
rational and self-interested aggregate of internal traits, The self is always social, and always 
social in a particular common sense and status quo, and that environment greatly impacts his or 
her preferences and choices. He shows that preferences are social habits normalized in common 
sense, not internal traits for which humans are entirely responsible or always rational and self-
interested.25 Again, James’ understanding of the self is superior to the problematic and simplistic 
characterization of Van Parijs’ liberal subject. The responsibility of activity and the definition 
of that which is human both make Van Parijs’ argument for BI difficult to endorse. They 
contradict the lived experience of what it means to be human and the empirical research 
regarding the same question. 
 
3.2.3 An Example from Disability Studies and the Repression of Common Sense 
 
24 Ch. 2.3; cf. William James, “Pragmatism and Common Sense” in The Writings of William James, 418-28. 
25 James does want people to take responsibility for their actions, but acknowledges the social forces involved in 
the creation of selfhood. See William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New 
York: Longmans, Green, 1907); ch. 8. 
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In order to demonstrate that preferences are social and that the preferences of the majority 
are a reflection of common sense, I turn to practical examples from disability studies. In Van 
Parijs’ defence of undominated diversity, he argues that “there are general talents (say, sight) 
everyone firmly values, whether or not one possesses them,”26 and concludes that persons with 
disabilities therefore deserve extra compensation through a BI. The first problem with the 
presumption of a universal preference for the talents of ability is that is it objectively incorrect: 
many people with disabilities live happy lives and would not choose to be “able-bodied” if they 
had the chance.27 The individualist mistake that Van Parijs makes is to assume that no one 
prefers a life without all “abilities.” This reflects the arguments I problematize in the above two 
sections: Van Parijs believes that inherent preferences are a necessary part of the human self 
and everyone rationally has similar, self-interested, economically-maximizing preferences. This 
assumption is particularly egregious when examined from the perspective of disability studies. 
Dan Goodley, a prominent author in disability studies, states the following, which applies 
especially well to utilitarian economics of Van Parijs: “Disability is understood as an act of 
exclusion: people are disabled by contemporary society.”28 Disability studies encapsulates a 
matrix of theories, pedagogies, and practices, but at its core is the study of socially constructed 
barriers that disable people. I will use disability studies to demonstrate the problematic nature 
of Van Parijs’ individualism. Disability studies shows that the preference for ability exists 
 
26 Ibid., 69. 
27 See Gary L. Albrecht and Patrick J. Devlieger, “The disability paradox: high quality of life against all odds,” 
Social Science & Medicine, 48, no. 8 (1999). The disability paradox is that people with serious and persistent 
disabilities report that they experience a good or excellent quality of life, in many cases, a higher quality of life 
than able-bodied people. 
28 Dan Goodley, Disability Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction (Los Angeles: Sage, 2010), 8. 
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because of a particular society where physical differences have negative social meaning. The 
(under)valuation of disability is part of an ableist worldview; people with disabilities lack 
“preferable talents” because of a world formed without their perspectives considered. According 
to the dominant voices in disability studies, disability is only negatively valued because of the 
exclusion of persons with disabilities from civic and political life. 
To further understand the ways that preferences are constructed and the ways common 
sense excludes particular perspectives, consider Vic Finkelstein’s famous thought example of a 
“disability village” wherein wheelchair-users are in the majority and the society is designed 
accordingly. Able-bodied people (or the ‘able-bodied disabled’) are marked by aching backs 
and bruises from banging their heads on low doorways and ceilings, so in response, doctors and 
specialists design aids for the ‘impaired:’ 
All the able-bodied are given special toughened helmets (provided free by the village) to 
wear at all times. Special braces are designed which give support while keeping the able-
bodied wearers bent at a height similar to the wheelchair-users. […] one person even goes 
so far as to suggest amputation to bring the able-bodied down to the right height!29 
 
This hypothetical situation demonstrates that preferences change based on social setting. In this 
world, the negative aspect of disability is neither natural nor inevitable. Instead, representational 
and institutional structures that constitute normalcy are designed in such a way that they exclude 
and pathologize differences of ability. Preferences are not purely individual. Talents may be 
internal to people, i.e. some are better at running, others are better at math, but the meaning of 
these talents are social and contextual.  
 
29 Val Finkelstein, “To Deny or Not to Deny Disability,” Physiotherapy 74, no. 12 (1988), 650. 
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As disability studies and James demonstrate, meaning is part of an inevitably imperfect 
common sense. 30 And when Van Parijs judges that which is preferable based in a majority or 
an imaginary consensus, he ignores common sense’s fallible nature. James claims that, “Pent in 
under every system of moral rules are innumerable persons whom it weighs upon and goods 
which it represses; and these are always rumbling and grumbling in the background and ready 
for any issue by which they may get free.”31 Common sense, as exhibited through the example 
of disability studies, is not de facto correct or even good. Common sense represses certain voices 
while it acknowledges—and makes common—others’, which is why an ethics based in James 
not interested in particular moral ideology, but on pre-moral inclusion. Pre-moral inclusion, or 
in a political, practical sense, “pragmatic inclusion,” transcends the divisions of ethical 
philosophy and allows inclusive dialogue to discover the confines of good and bad. Ethics is not 
about equal or equitable treatment, but the expansion of who is included in ethical dialogue. The 
impact of inclusion on BI will become apparent in the final chapter, but the impact of common 
sense on the self, preferences, and choices is clear: the traits of the self are always influenced 
by common sense, and without radical inclusion, the common sense impacting these traits is 
necessarily exclusive and imperfect. Talents associated with ability are only absolutely preferred 
when the voices of persons with disabilities are not influential in its ethical dialogue. 
 
30 For more on the relationship between James and disability studies, cf. Jill Marsden, “Adventures at the Fringe 
of Thought,” William James Studies 13, no. 1 (2017), 92-116. Marsden, a literary scholar, argues that James’ 
conception of the “stream of thought” found in his Principles of Psychology widens the definition of 
consciousness in order to include people with intellectual disabilities as legitimate conscious beings. The “fringe” 
of thought in James’ (re)definition of (con)sciousness forces us to “rethink consciousness beyond self-reflective 
norms” (Marsden, 105). 
31 William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” in The Writings of William James, 624. 
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Giving people with unique challenges extra compensation is admirable, but the reason 
provided by Van Parijs is insufficient and incomplete. He does not explain how taste is 
developed or where it originates. He merely claims that people have tastes, and these tastes 
dictate whether a talent is bad enough for extra compensation. There is no systemic 
understanding in his texts. Van Parijs’ understanding of the self, namely an aggregate of 
independent talents, tastes, and choices, misses the social context inherent in the self, and it 
excludes the voices of the “other.” I explained that his individualism blames the poor for their 
poverty and considers majority preferences the judge of good and bad, which accepts the 
perspectives of common sense, or the status quo. If the voices of marginalized people are part 
of the dialogue defining good and bad, perhaps our society would look more like the “disability 
village,” or at least it would be more accessible for people with disabilities. 
Simply put, Van Parijs’ liberal and utilitarian perspective regarding the self renders the 
status quo as a suitable method for making ethical arguments by making individual preferences 
the arbiter of ethics. Such a conception of selfhood cannot withstand basic empirical and 
philosophical scrutiny: BI needs a different philosophy of the individual. James’ pragmatism 
shows that many perspectives are repressed by contemporary common sense, that current 
preferences are a component of a fallible common sense, and that pragmatic inclusion is the best 
foundation to develop or acquire ethical habits and ethical individuals. Every moral perspective, 
and especially those currently repressed, need to be considered when arguing for a just 
distribution of wealth. And if we listen to the voices of those outside of the boundaries of 
common sense we will hear that people with disabilities often do not value “ability” the way 
that able-bodied people do. A better way to argue for an ethical method of redistribution uses 
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an expansive view of the self, one that includes family, friends, work, and generally, everything 
that impacts a human being. Traits are not inherent, and individuals are not entirely responsible 
for them; traits are developed through habits and are deeply connected to the social world. 
Family, property, the product of one’s labour, and the recognition of friends all are part of the 
subjective experience of living, always encapsulated by a society that dictates common sense. 
This unfinished self is open to experiment, growth, and new perspectives, unable to be defined 
by internal aspects of Van Parijs’ selfhood. Van Parijs’ conception of the self is fundamentally 
deficient and should be replaced by James’ expansive and structural understandings of the self. 
An ethical argument like BI requires a broad understanding of ethics, and the way that repressive 
common sense dictates the boundaries of good and bad cannot be reduced to utilitarian 
preferences. 
 
3.3 The Free-Rider Problem: Van Parijs and Economic Value:  
Van Parijs’ philosophical worldview involves his understanding of value, and I will 
demonstrate the ways it, like his conception of the self, is too limited and therefore deficient as 
a method for justifying BI. The value of a resource, according to Van Parijs, depends on 
“competitive market prices,” i.e., that “the weight ascribed to each resource reflects the cost to 
others of not being able to use it.”32 Resources are therefore priced based on the number of 
people that have preferences for them, i.e. through the principle of supply and demand. Prices 
 
32 Ibid. 
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in real freedom for all “emerge from free choices on the basis of equal entitlements.”33 In the 
same way that the moral character of talents and traits are determined by majority moral 
preferences, competitive market prices are determined by majority preferences of the market, 
which Van Parijs assumes are adequate in determining economic value. 
Van Parijs’ perspectives about valuable activity is expressed in his argument against the 
“free-rider” objection to BI. He argues that people inherit historical value through income, and 
since no one worked for the extra value inherited from their past, it should be distributed through 
BI.34 This philosophy of value is a method to defend against BI critics who argue that “free-
riders,” i.e. those who choose not to work should not be entitled to a BI. Van Parijs summarizes 
this problem by proposing another two identically-talented but differently disposed characters 
(i.e. characters with different tastes): Crazy and Lazy. The story is as follows: “Crazy is keen to 
earn a high income and works a lot for that purpose. Lazy is far less excited by the prospect of 
a high income and has decided to take it easy. […] Does not the high grant justified by our 
criterion illegitimately discriminate against Crazy in favour of Lazy?35 The “free-rider” problem 
 
33 Ibid., 32. It is important to note that this analogy again uncovers Van Parijs’ liberal-economist tendencies. Not 
all external endowments can be owned like property, such as clean air and social myths, but private property is 
used as a metaphor for everything that allows people to flourish. 
34 This explanation of “inheritance” has nothing to do with the practice of passing on property or wealth upon the 
death of an individual. Van Parijs’ inheritance is much broader in scope; everything accessible to an individual 
that he or she did not personally earn but has a positive impact on their ability to make money is Van Parijs’ 
inheritance. Further, Van Parijs’ inheritance does not free him from my claim that his point of departure blames 
the poor for their poverty. Inheritance is a socio-historical phenomenon in which societies of the past provide 
“gifts” to present societies that enhance productive potential. It is explicitly positive and does not include the 
inheritance of hardship or intergenerational trauma. 
35 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 92-3. 
 
Chapter Three 
 70 
is the loudest moral objection to BI.36 Richard Musgrave, a critic of BI, makes this argument 
succinctly: 
Implementation of maximin37 thus leads to a redistributive system that, among individuals 
with equal earnings ability, favors those with a high preference for leisure. It is to the 
advantage of recluses, saints, and (nonconsulting) scholars who earn but little and hence will 
not have to contribute greatly to redistribution.38 
 
Why should those who make an income in the formal economy subsidize those who are 
voluntarily unemployed? Within Van Parijs’ “neutral” paradigm, BI seems to punish those who 
prefer work and income and reward those who would rather avoid formal work. 
Van Parijs defends his proposal by continuing with the Crazy-Lazy thought experiment: in 
order for Crazy to generate the level of income she desires, she needs “certain assets external to 
her talents, say a plot of land.”39 It is certainly fair (from a real freedom perspective) to give 
Crazy and Lazy equal plots of land, but according to Van Parijs, it is fair only if the plots of land 
are tradeable. Crazy wants more than her plot, and Lazy is indifferent about losing some of his 
in exchange for part of Crazy’s product. This leads to the following suggestion: “There is a non-
arbitrary and generally positive legitimate level of basic income that is determined by the per 
 
36 Stuart White, “Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income,” Political 
Studies, 45, no. 2 (1997); G. Van Donselaar, The right to exploit. Parasitism, scarcity, basic income (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); W. Galston. “What about reciprocity?” in What’s wrong with a free lunch? eds. 
P. Van Parijs, J. Cohen, and J. Rogers (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001); Stuart White, The civic minimum (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). 
37 See ch. 1.4 for the explanation of maximin. 
38Richard A. Musgrave, “Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-off,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 88 
(1974), 632. 
39 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 98 
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capita value of society’s external assets and must be entirely financed by those who appropriate 
these assets.”40  
This analogy holds up in a hypothetical sense, but the essential question is, “what constitutes 
Van Parijs’ collection of external assets?” His first answer is striking: what is relevant, he 
claims, is “the whole set of external means that affect people’s capacity to pursue their 
conceptions of the good life, irrespective of whether they are natural or produced.”41 Everything 
“endowed” involved in the pursuit of the good life comprises external “wealth” to be distributed. 
Examples include “factories,” “public bridges,” “nursery rhymes and computer programmes, 
the work ethic and nuclear technology.”42 Van Parijs calls this wealth “our inheritance,” “mainly 
in the form of technology in the broadest sense.”43 This acknowledges that production relies on 
much more than individual effort: capital, fertility of soil, and efficiency of tools are all 
examples of external conditions that make labour more “productive.” And as such, people do 
not have as high a claim on their “creations” as it may seem. Nearly everything necessary in 
earning an income or holding a job is based in value not created by one individual’s activity, 
but created by, in general, the development of modern societies throughout history. 
 
3.3.1 Jobs as Assets: Van Parijs’ 1995 Defence Against the Free-Rider Argument 
 
40 Ibid., 99. 
41 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 101. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 90. 
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Where Van Parijs’ “inheritance” is located in his argument changes throughout his career. 
In his 1995 Real Freedom for All, the text with his most expansive normative argument for BI, 
he argues that we should “give each member of the society concerned a tradable entitlement to 
an equal share of […] jobs.”44 This is because jobs—a scarce asset in capitalism45—are the locus 
of socio-historical inheritance. With jobs, people are able to pursue real freedom, and jobs (with 
the salaries they generate) are only available because of a history in which no one alive had any 
part. Therefore the voluntarily unemployed give up their share of job-assets (high salaries) and 
trade them for employment rent (taxation on the employed distributed through BI). This trade 
is non-exploitative, Van Parijs argues, because “income should be an increasing function of 
effort or […] there should be a positive correlation between effort and income,”46 and this is 
still possible with BI. If I want to make a lot of money, I can still do so in a world with BI, and 
it will take personal effort and labour to succeed in this way. A positive correlation between 
labour and income—a condition of justice for Van Parijs47—is maintained with a BI, and as 
such, Van Parijs avoids the indictment of exploitation. 
 
 
44 Ibid., 108. 
45 Ibid., 107. This is either because of the insider-outsider approach, in which the costs associated with hiring, 
firing, and training cause employers to pay more to workers, or, Van Parijs’ preference, the efficiency wage 
approach, which states that there is a positive causal link between wages and labour productivity. There are other 
reasons for this fact of capitalism (ex. Marx’s reserve army of labour), but Van Parijs takes this job scarcity as an 
established fact of capitalism. 
46 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 167. 
47 This relationship between labour and income is a condition of justice for Van Parijs, but only with the addition 
of undominated diversity as a constraint: “alienable assets should be transferred so that all could achieve […] a 
quality of life that would not be unanimously considered as worse […] than that achievable by others” (ibid., 
184). 
Chapter Three 
 73 
3.3.2 The Gift-Distribution Machine: Van Parijs’ 2017 Defence Against the Free-Rider 
Argument 
In 2017, Van Parijs uses a slightly different argument against the free-rider objection. 
Although the Van Parijs of 1995 flirts with the way that gifts and inheritance straddle society 
(i.e. “the whole set of external means that affect people’s capacity to pursue their conceptions 
of the good life” and external means make labour more “productive”), 1995’s Real Freedom for 
All only examines jobs as the assets necessary to pursue a good life. In Van Parijs’ most recent 
text, Basic Income, he makes no mention of “jobs as assets.” The justification for BI against the 
“free-rider” problem broadens; Van Parijs reiterates that everything is a gift from previous 
generations, and that distributive justice does not maximize real freedom as such, but it 
maximins “the gifts that form the substratum of this freedom.”48 Van Parijs argues that people 
benefit unequally from what has been freely given by (lucky) social heritage, and these gifts 
(not exclusively jobs) are best distributed in the form of state-sponsored financial benefits.  
Much of what humans inherit is not of their own making, Van Parijs argues, and a basic 
income ensures that “everyone receives a fair share of what none of us did anything for, of the 
huge present very unequally incorporated into our incomes.”49 The Van Parijs of 2017 credits 
most of what people earn not to their individual efforts, but to externalities: the economy 
functions as a massive “gift-distribution machine”50 that distributes our common inheritance in 
the form of income. And beyond this, the actual opportunities people experience are created 
 
48 Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income, 105. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 106. 
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through the unpredictable interactions between innate capacities and innumerable other 
circumstances “such as happening to have a congenial primary school teacher or an inspiring 
boss, to belong to a lucky generation, to a native language in high demand, or to get a tip for the 
right job at the right time.”51 These gifts, currently disseminated unequally and arbitrarily (the 
consequences of which are inherent in the lucky party’s income), are better distributed, Van 
Parijs argues, through BI. 
The most immediate and most important reaction to this justification (and his previous one) 
goes as follows: “But I was the one who did the work to get and keep my job! How can any of 
my income be considered a gift? I worked hard to be where I am today!” Van Parijs responds 
to this retort by arguing that activity does not necessarily entitle an individual to all the earnings 
associated with it. If I am required to politely attend my boring aunt’s tea parties in order to be 
included in her will, this action does not ethically entitle me to her multi-million-dollar 
inheritance. Similarly, going to the office every day and “busying oneself” does not mean that 
one’s entire salary is deserved because that salary exists “by virtue of a combination of 
circumstances most of which are no less arbitrary, ethically speaking, than the fact that one 
happens to have a rich aunt.”52 Van Parijs suggests that the circumstances that allow for the 
creation of a business, being born at the time and place that allows for such a profession, and 
even getting the job itself has more to do with other circumstances than with personal effort and 
responsibility. The gifts that people are given, i.e. the “material substratum of their real 
 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 107. 
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freedom,” are currently unequally distributed through luck, but are equalized with BI, and what 
people do with these gifts is merely an indirect consequence of what they are given. 
 
3.3.3 The Problem of an Economic Inheritance 
The shift from a job-based inheritance to one in which inheritance is located in the activity 
that creates income is an encouraging one, but it does not go far enough. Van Parijs 
acknowledges two important things that plagued his earlier text: that gifts are not only 
distributed through holding a job, and that the correlation between activity and income is not 
only the result of hard work, but mostly because of luck and the contributions from human 
history. He shows that distribution from those with incomes to those without is fair because it 
distributes that which all ought to inherit. No one worked for their socio-historical inheritance, 
so everyone has an equal claim to it. But this argument remains entirely within the realm of the 
economic. Beyond his measure of economic value being decided upon by the individual 
preferences of supply and demand, a problem explained in section three, the value of social 
inheritance is only passed along through economic jobs or income. Since inheritance in Van 
Parijs’ conception is only bestowed through the economic realm, only those activities that create 
growth in the economic realm are part of an individual’s socio-historical inheritance. And 
because inheritance is the sole source of historical value, only activity that creates economic 
growth—and the inheritance that this growth endows upon people of the future—is valuable at 
all. Non-economic activity is not considered in Van Parijs’ understanding of historical value, 
merely the activity that adds money to a wage or salary. Therefore, the likely hypothesis that 
can be abducted from this claim is that contemporary activity is only valuable, according to Van 
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Parijs, if it adds to the future of economic inheritance in the form of an increased wage or salary. 
So, contemporary activity is only valuable when it has economic consequences, which means 
that non-economic activity (any unpaid activity) is unrelated to value.53 
This understanding of value being only within the economic realm is a common idea 
throughout Van Parijs’ texts (as well as in most economics texts throughout Western history). 
To explain the way that he privileges the economic over all other forms of value, I present an 
example he uses when investigating whether publicly-owned goods should be added to the 
privately-owned goods used for taxation. In this example, he invokes a public park:  
the value of such a public good may be incorporated in the increased value of the 
surrounding land and buildings, whose value is already up for redistribution. In the case of 
other public goods, such as a toll-free bridge, one must be careful not to focus exclusively 
on direct beneficiaries. You may never have crossed the bridge, but the tomatoes you eat are 
cheaper or fresher or both because the bridge exists.54 
 
Value for Van Parijs is exclusively measured through a capitalist lens. He disregards the 
meaningful relationships people build in the public park, the beauty that such a space brings to 
a city, and the impact on mental and physical health that parks offer. Clean air and water, healthy 
habitats for pollination and ecological health, and a connection to nature cannot be measured 
through this economic, capitalist definition of value. Van Parijs measures value only in purely 
economic terms—in this case in nearby housing prices. And in the case of the construction of 
historical vale, Van Parijs measures value only through the activity that creates economic 
 
53 Or, unpaid labour is unrelated to the value that can be inherited (the only form of value he considers in his 
economic analysis). I admit that Van Parijs never argues for such a position, but by privileging paid labour above 
unpaid labour in his argument against the “free-rider” he falls into the liberal trap in which activity that does not 
contribute directly to economic growth is assumed not only unproductive, but worth-less. Devaluing unpaid 
activity is a hypothesis inherent in Van Parijs’ philosophy, not an explicit end of his argument. 
54 Ibid., 103. 
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impacts. This economic bias is not the way value ought to be understood, especially through the 
lens of James’ social ethics. 
 
3.4 The Value of Non-Economic Activity: A Critique of Economistic Value 
Although James is usually considered an individualist philosopher,55 it is clear from his 
understanding of common sense, social habits, and the social and cultural dimensions of the 
self, that everything that makes an individual is deeply in debt to the social world. In fact, even 
truth itself, according to James, is contextual. In James’ Pragmatism, he offers a conception of 
truth that purports to being practical and dynamic. Instead of a static and objective sense of true 
reality, James claims that truth “is simply a collective name for verification-processes […] Truth 
is made, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience.”56 Through 
the experimentation process (experimental action, listening, and revision), humans come to 
understand that which is true, and what works within a particular social reality is defined as true. 
That means that not only morality, but truth itself, is context-dependent.57 True beliefs are 
always proven true or false in practical, social, and contextual experience. James says that 
 
55 Cf., Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1935); 
James Campbell, “William James and the Ethics of Fulfillment.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 
17, no. 3 (1981). 
56 William James, “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” in The Writings of William James, 436. 
57 There are three limitations to James’ conception of truth. First, agreement with matters of fact, such as the 
existence of Japan or that the object on the wall is a clock, lives “for the most part on the credit system. Our 
thoughts and beliefs ‘pass,’ so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses 
them” (ibid., 433). Second, for relations of ideas such as mathematics and abstract ideas, truth is that which leads: 
“Our ideas must agree with realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, 
under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration” (434). As long as the “truth” of Japan’s existence or that 
1+1=2 are expedient in practical world, they are proven true. The process of truth thirdly must correspond to “the 
whole body of other truths already in our possessions” (434). 
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individuals have a “stock of truths”58 that have worked in the past which resists change until 
modifications are necessary, and only occur through interaction with new practical experiences. 
Truth—that ideal that humans hold so dear—is made through encounters with the world, and 
these encounters come in every realm of life, social, political, economic, and personal. This 
understanding of truth is another example of the necessary social relationship between the self 
(and all of its components) and the world in which it develops. Social reality impacts individual 
stocks of truth, and when enough individuals are changed, common sense follows. 
The pragmatic conception of truth shows us that preferences in an individual are only true 
in a specific set of other social truths in a particular society of habits and common sense. The 
point that overturns Van Parijs’ economistic conception of value is that social meaning, that 
which allows the world to function, is dependent on interdependent humans inside and outside 
the economy. As Throntveit says, James believes that “freedom, wisdom, and virtue are realized 
through participation in society’s running discussion of its goals.”59 The realization of these 
virtues is not found within mere preferences, but at the end of a process in which participation 
in ethical dialogue precedes the social habits and norms of reality. The root of James’ conception 
of truth is that being with others precedes being at all.60 Our conceptions of self, truth, ethics, 
and everything in existence today are thanks to the contributions of other people. Not all of that 
can be subsumed under an economic worldview. The language mothers use when soothing their 
babies, recipes required for a family dinner, and the stories we tell each other for laughter, joy, 
 
58 William James, “What Pragmatism Means,” in The Writings of William James, 382. 
59 Trygve Throntveit, William James and the Quest for an Ethical Republic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014), 139. 
60 As such, inclusion is a prerequisite not only for morality, but also for (any conception of) truth. 
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and community form people and societies as a whole, rather than simply as economic agents in 
an economistic ideology. Much of what creates human beings and is valuable in their 
development is not represented in an income or a job. And therefore, activity that does not 
impact the economy is valuable too. 
A useful way of understanding the difference between that which creates value and 
economic value is Marx’s between “use-value” and “exchange-value.” Something has use-value 
because it can be used to satisfy human needs, while exchange-value only is meaningful because 
it can be traded for other things with use-values.61 Every action, belief, and relationship has a 
use-value in the ethical republic and has the potential, through ethical deliberation, to change 
common sense (i.e. truth) in the world. Only activity that produces exchange-value in a capitalist 
society is considered in Van Parijs’ understanding of value. Van Parijs’ self needs expansion to 
include the influence of imperfect common sense, and Van Parijs’ conception of value and 
argument for BI should include the activity that is useful and valuable outside of the economy. 
There are advocates of BI that acknowledge non-economic value. For example, Michel 
Bauwens and Rogier De Langhe state that “Even though it is unconditional, a basic income is 
not ‘money for nothing,’ but rather a lump sum compensation for participation in the 
commons.”62 Therefore, they argue, “the plea for a basic income is not a plea for an alternative 
social security, but rather a plea for an alternative funding of civil society.”63 The essential point, 
made most presciently by James, is that everyone in society impacts their society in a way that 
 
61 Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1990), ch. 1. 
62 Michel Bauwens and Rogier De Langhe, Sauver le monde: Vers une économie post-capitaliste avec le peer-to-
peer (Les Liens Qui Liberent Editions, 2015). Quoted in Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income, 280-1. 
63 Ibid., 281. This perspective will be further analyzed in the next chapter. 
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cannot be quantified. By explaining the ways that meaning and truths are created through 
individual and social experiments, based on human needs and ideals, James calls forth the way 
that every action and demand follows from and contributes to social value. A social conception 
of valuable activity that broadens Van Parijs’ economic value renders human activity 
necessarily meaningful, and therefore, human inheritance is found within language, 
relationships, belief systems, volunteer work, nature, leisure, and everything in between. The 
capacity to live in a society, which precedes life as such, is in debt to active communities of the 
past, and activity in present communities reinforces or revolutionizes society, both of which are 
valuable without reference to economics. 
As we see, Van Parijs, through arguing that the gifts of the past are distributed through that 
economy, makes BI misunderstands the location of value in a society. He limits the scope of 
that which is valuable by philosophizing socio-historical inheritance, i.e. the location of value, 
exclusively as activity that is economically productive, i.e., that which increases salaries and 
wages. He may refer to this economistic method of thinking in order to be persuasive in a world 
dominated by capitalism—which is an admirable pursuit—but his arguments contain inherent 
flaws and unconvincing assumptions about human activity. Since he argues that activity is only 
valuable when it impacts the economy, Van Parijs ignores the foundation of human life: the 
interaction and activities of diverse people inside and outside the economy. 
 
3.4.1 The Pragmatic Defence Against the Free-Rider Objection 
Ethics, selves, and values (or preferences) are constructed through rich and complex cultural 
processes. The basis of life is a culture in which humans, with acquired habits within social 
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common sense, make demands, and as James says, “the essence of good is simply to satisfy 
demand.”64 Demands make a culture, and the satisfaction of more demands than does the status 
quo is the precondition to a common sense that reflects the perspectives of those that it impacts. 
Thus, satisfying and listening to demands is the responsibility of an ethical republic—the 
economy is not the only factor in cultural meaning and ethical responsibility. Individuals who 
do not engage in the formal economy still engage in their culture, and their activity should be 
valued irrespective of its impact on the economy.  
Instead of a defence against the “free-rider” objection based in liberal individualism and a 
value system that presumes value in an economic paradigm, a pragmatist argument for an 
obligation-free BI begins with the recognition that the meaning of human activity is historically 
inherited and presently embodied in everyday activity. Therefore, value is inherent and integral 
in activity with “exchange-value,” such as the activity of a factory worker or a CEO, and in 
activity with pure “use-value,” such as the care of a single mother for her children, intellectual 
growth of an unemployed student, or community created through activism, civic associations, 
volunteering, or a shared love of sport, creativity, or ideals. All activity creates meaning in the 
world and is made valuable by its place in the creation and maintenance of common sense. That 
means that much of the valuable activity from the past is not inherited through the economy, 
and therefore Van Parijs’ argument relies on a limited set of valuable activities in arguing why 
“non-productive citizens” or “free-riders” ought to receive BI. A Jamesian justification of BI 
accepts that all activity is valuable, and therefore a work-obligation in BI is nonsensical.  
 
64 James, “The Moral Philosopher”, 621. 
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In order to include more voices in the process of creating a more ethical society, there cannot 
be theoretical discrimination between waged, “productive” activity and unwaged, “non-
productive” activity. The foundation of a Jamesian BI is pre-moral inclusion, and this condition 
is disinterested in the types of activities in which people engage; instead it advocates for radical 
inclusion and allows the ethical dialogue to determine what is good and bad. James investigates 
that which is meaningful, namely all activity, rather than a predetermined set of valuable or 
worthless actions. By existing, people add to their world, and their voices ought to be involved 
in the ethical republic, and therefore, BI is necessarily universal. Economic activity is not 
activity’s only valuable form, as Van Parijs assumes. A richer explanation of why BI succeeds 
in expanding the ethical republic will be proposed in the final chapter, but to summarize, 
participation in the ethical republic requires enough resources to survive, and BI provides these 
resources; BI is the substratum, not for “real freedom,” but for democracy. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter exposed two problems with Van Parijs’ philosophical ideology, namely the 
conception of self and societal value, and used James as the thinker to solves these problems. I 
argue that, because Van Parijs’ conception of self assumes preferences and choices are inherent 
traits of individuals, he positions the responsibility for poverty in inherent traits of the poor; that 
his conception of the self is based in homo economicus and is therefore disconnected with the 
social nature of human existence; and that his individualism exposes that good and bad in his 
liberal philosophy are based in fallible norms in common sense, as explained through the 
example of disability studies. And his conception of valuable activity only accounts for the 
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activity that produces economic gain, thereby reducing the value of non-economic activity to 
zero, which results in a theory that either accepts that economic activity is superior in every way 
to care-giving, volunteering, community-building, and other non-economic activity, or a theory 
that is unsalvageable. 
James, on the other hand, shows that the choices made by individuals are always made in 
particular social contexts influenced by habits and common sense, and therefore there are 
structural factors which create social conditions such as poverty. Common sense is influential 
in the social and cultural aspects of the self, as James shows, and the social realm precedes the 
possibility and the meaningfulness of individuals. And the example from disability studies 
demonstrates the impact of cultural norms and habits in the production of individual preferences. 
Regarding the value of activity, James shows that non-economic activity is a necessary, and 
therefore valuable, part of the creation of common sense. As such, I suggested a Jamesian 
argument that overcomes the “free-rider” problem, namely that all activity is valuable, and 
therefore the humans who hold perspectives and act in ways that help form (or should help form) 
the ideology of common sense (always fallible, social, and personal) ought to be given the means 
to perform their actions. Inclusion, rather than an ideology based in freedom, is BI’s best 
defence. And in the case of the philosophy of the self and of valuable activity, inclusion again 
overcomes the limitations of Van Parijs’ liberalism. An argument for BI does not need to be a 
project of individualism or economism, as applying James’ social ethics demonstrates. BI can 
avoid philosophical deficiencies by adopting pragmatic inclusion as its basis. 
Van Parijs’ philosophical perspective lacks a structural conception of the individual and the 
historical and contemporary impacts on society’s norms and practices. As James shows, 
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common sense is impactful in the production of selfhood, individual preferences, and social 
meaning. But also, every action of every individual impacts common sense, either by 
transgressing it or maintaining it. And the biggest problem with a lack of structural 
understanding in Van Parijs is that he deems current norms as sufficient for judging the ethical 
value of preferences and actions. A Jamesian conception of the systemic nature of reality not 
only acknowledges empirical facts, such as the reality that context impacts individuals, but it 
also recognizes that common sense is dictated by those who are heard. The power of creating 
social reality lays in the hands of everyone, but not everyone has the means to impact common 
sense in the same way. In the next chapter, I will investigate the contemporary state of people 
on welfare and who has the most influence on formal and informal decision-making processes. 
All of this will be done with a backdrop that recognizes the ways that societies impact 
individuals and that social norms, that without political and economic systems that broaden the 
boundaries of who has influence on these norms, are imperfect and incomplete.
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Chapter Four: Reconstructing Basic Income: From Real Freedom for All to Pragmatic 
Inclusion for an Ethical Democracy 
4.1 Introduction 
Van Parijs’ basic income (BI) argument has significant flaws, but it is the single most 
influential case for BI in the literature. The previous chapters demonstrated these weaknesses, 
namely, Van Parijs’ abstract foundations of freedom and equality (chapter two), his reliance on 
a limited conception of the individual, and his depreciation of the value of social, non-economic 
activity (chapter three). William James’ foundation for ethical philosophy is practical rather than 
abstract, wherein inclusion is the ethical prerequisite (hence my designation of Jamesian ethics 
as “pre-moral inclusion”), and ethics is a method of activity with three cyclical moments: 
experimentation, listening, and revising one’s experiment. James’ conception of the individual 
is a vast expanse of personal, social, and cultural forces, instead of an aggregate of individual 
preferences and choices. And James shows that the social and cultural forces that are part of 
human identity—and part of human meaning and ethics—are the production of a collective 
common sense, ultimately constructed by the mediation of felt human experiences in the social 
realm. Through James’ social ethics, I showed that Van Parijs’ justification was inadequate, but 
rather than rejecting Van Parijs’ entire argument based on these flaws, this chapter reconstructs 
an ethical justification of BI with a pragmatic and Jamesian foundation, structure, and goal. 
Western welfare systems, like all experimental ethical activity, are fallible and can only be 
properly judged after their enactment. My first argument, in section two, investigates the actual 
impact of welfare and poverty on human beings by listening to their voices and their stories. In 
this section, a brief summary of the impacts of BI is provided as practical evidence that BI can 
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“appease” the “cries of the wounded.”1 Section three argues that contemporary Western 
democracies are deficient, not only in the ways that people in poverty are excluded, but in that 
the structure of political influence is currently exclusive. And because expanding inclusion is 
the prerequisite for an ethical society, I argue that the best method to solve the problem of 
welfare and the problem of democracy is pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy, which 
substitutes for Van Parijs’ ideal, real freedom for all. Pragmatic inclusion for an ethical 
democracy is the Jamesian principle in which inclusion is foundational and democracy (as an 
inclusive decision-making process) is its goal. 
Section five investigates existing literature that justifies BI as a core component of 
democracy, but I will show that the arguments provided are insufficient to attain pragmatic 
inclusion, so in section five, I provide my definition and argument for BI as an example of a 
policy that creates pragmatic inclusion. The definition I provide is an income, paid at a level 
that covers basic needs, irrespective of employment, and funded by the ultra-rich. This definition 
is less specific than Van Parijs’ (“a regular income paid in cash to every individual member of 
a society, irrespective of income from other sources and with no strings attached”2), and I argue 
that this type of BI is appropriate to the goals of pragmatic inclusion, namely, that poverty cannot 
exclude communities from engaging in decision-making and common-sense-making activities, 
and that wealth cannot buy extra influence in these processes. Finally, in section six, I suggest 
supplemental policies that could further the goal of BI, i.e. pragmatic inclusion, with special 
 
1 William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” in The Writings of William James: A 
Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 626. 
2 Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a 
Sane Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 4. 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 87 
attention paid to the “social virtues” of William James. Overall, this chapter shows that the 
contemporary state of welfare and democracy in the West requires revision and new 
experiments, such as BI, that create pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy. Poverty and 
unequal levels of socio-political influence exclude felt human experiences from impacting the 
status quo, and BI is a necessary step to rectify this problem in democracy. 
 
4.2 Experimentation, Listening, and Welfare Reform 
Pragmatists such as William James use the pragmatic method to understand the world and 
to identify problems. James defines this method as “The attitude of looking away from first 
things, principles, ‘categories’, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts.”3 Rather than beginning with an ideal such as freedom, the best way to 
judge a human experiment is through its impact on human beings, specifically by “how much 
more outcry or how much appeasement comes about.”4 Thus, in order to determine whether the 
current welfare system—the structure BI aims to reform—has a problem that ought to be solved, 
the voices of people, or “the cries of the wounded,”5 need to be heard. There have been many 
BI experiments and trials where people previously in the welfare system were given a BI instead, 
and listening to their experiences of poverty and the changes caused by BI shows that the status 
quo is deeply problematic. 
 
 
3 William James, “What Pragmatism Means,” in The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. 
J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 380. 
4 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 624. 
5 Ibid., 626. 
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4.2.1 Basic Income Pilot Projects 
Contemporary welfare systems in the West do not create the conditions for people in 
poverty to thrive. In Ontario, Canada, the Conservative provincial government abandoned a BI 
pilot project in 2018, but before it was cancelled, reporters asked people previously on welfare 
how their lives changed with BI. The experiences of three residents of Hamilton, Ontario are 
particularly interesting: Wendy Moore had been homeless for nearly two years, Alana Baltzer 
grew up on welfare and lived in social housing for most of her life, and Kathy Mahood fell into 
poverty after a work-related back injury and the death of her husband. With the current welfare 
system, they were unable to live happy, healthy lives, despite receiving state-funded welfare. 
Moore said she was “barely surviving”6 on $330 a month from Ontario’s welfare program. But 
with the BI, Moore—and all participants—received $1,416 a month, which Moore said 
impacted her in the following ways: “It is giving me back my independence, I don’t feel so 
backed into a corner. If I want to eat, I can afford to buy something instead of going to a food 
bank or a soup kitchen.”7 Baltzer said that she could only afford clothing at thrift stores and 
developed chronic teeth problems caused by years of poor eating and that BI was “a huge life-
change for me, I have a full fridge. I am eating more healthy food.”8 And Mahood, after falling 
into poverty, could not pay her bills with income supplements and was going to lose her 
apartment. But with BI, she said that “I feel healthier and I am not stressed all the time about 
 
6 Laurie Monsebraaten, “From ‘barely surviving’ to thriving: Ontario basic income recipients report less stress, 
better health,” Toronto Star (2018). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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money.”9 When the pilot project was cancelled, participants were devastated; the Hamilton 
Spectator interviewed other participants, many whom say they will now return to homelessness, 
lose affordable housing, cancel plans to return to school, or return unwillingly to a life of sex 
trade work.10 The contemporary welfare systems in the West appear problematic, as exhibited 
through the “outcry” from the voices of those most impacted. The voices of people living in 
poverty—about one in seven Canadians11—are not acknowledged by the social norms and 
habits of the status quo, or as James calls it, “common sense.”12 Common sense represses the 
voices on its periphery, as is exhibited by the tolerance people in the West have for marginal 
poverty.13 These negative outcomes are what I call the “problem of welfare” but another welfare 
method, namely BI experiments, has been overwhelmingly positive.  
A pilot project in Dauphin, Manitoba, found significant health benefits and increased 
enrolment in education.14 In the Netherlands, experiments with BI resulted in participants 
keeping a larger percentage of earnings relative to welfare and a general increase to wellbeing.15 
In Finland, a BI experiment found betterment of wellbeing for the participants compared to the 
 
9 Ibid. 
10 Natalie Paddon, “Basic income: Life before, after and, once again, without,” The Hamilton Spectator (2018). 
For more research suggesting that the welfare system in the West causes undue suffering, cf. Karen A. Curtis, 
“‘Bottom-Up’ Poverty And Welfare Policy Discourse: Ethnography To The Rescue?” Urban Anthropology and 
Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development 28, no. 2 (1999): 103-40. 
11 Statistics Canada, “Table 11-10-0015-01,” Before-tax and after-tax low income status (census family LIM) by 
family type and family composition, 2019. 
12 See ch. 2.3. Jamesian common sense is an ethical equilibrium established by “what works” throughout human 
history that culturally defines social ethics through norms, laws, and habits. See William James, “Pragmatism and 
Common Sense” in The Writings of William James, 418-28. 
13 Implicit acceptance of poverty is a cultural phenomenon; if the social ethics prohibited poverty, there would be 
mechanisms to prevent and eradicate it. 
14 Evelyn L. Forget, “The Town with No Poverty: The Health Effects of a Canadian Guaranteed Annual Income 
Field Experiment.” Canadian Public Policy 37, no. 3 (2011): 283-305. 
15 Robert van der Veen, “Basic Income Experiments in the Netherlands?” Basic Income Studies (2019). 
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control group on welfare: “Those in the test group experienced significantly fewer problems 
related to health, stress and ability to concentrate. […] [They were] more confident in their own 
future and their ability to influence societal issues than the control group.”16 In North Carolina, 
a BI trial in the Cherokee nation that equally distributed profits from a casino found similarly 
encouraging results: beyond the reduction in poverty, “behavioral problems among children 
who had been lifted out of poverty went down 40%, […] juvenile crime rates among the 
Cherokee also declined, along with drug and alcohol use, while their school scores improved 
markedly.”17 These experiments show “appeasement” and a general positive impact on people 
in poverty when they receive BI. There are health benefits, more educational involvement, the 
growth of personal and social confidence, and reductions in crime. In other words, BI creates 
conditions in which marginalized populations are included in the informal decision-making 
processes of society. It decreases the features of poverty that exclude: ill health, lack of 
education, the possibility of imprisonment, along with many others. BI is a clear possible 
solution to the problem of welfare, and as I will show in the following sections, a method for 
solving another great contemporary ill: the problem of democracy. 
 
4.3 Democracy and Inclusion 
 
16 Olli Kangas, Signe Jauhiainen, Miska Simanainen, Minna Ylikännö, “The basic income experiment 2017–2018 
in Finland: Preliminary Results” Reports and Memorandums of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 9 
(2019): 20. The Finland experiment is particularly interesting to this thesis because an explicit purpose of the 
pilot was “to find out whether the introduction of a basic income could make the social security system in Finland 
more inclusive and further increase the labour supply” (Ibid., iv, emphasis added). 
17 Rutger Bregman, Utopia for Realists: How We Can Build the Ideal World (New York: Little, Brown and 
Company, 2017), 99. 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 91 
As explained in chapter two, inclusion is a prerequisite for the growth of an ethical republic. 
Since ethics, meaning, and ideologies are built through the mediation of felt human experience 
in the social realm, the greater the number of beings who contribute to this dialogue, the better 
common sense reflects the perspectives of the people it impacts. The more inclusive the culture, 
the more common sense aligns with the demands of that culture. As James says, “the victory to 
be philosophically prayed for is that of the more inclusive side.”18 Everyone in a society is 
subject to cultural norms and laws, but not everyone can influence them. Western democracies 
give every citizen the formal right to vote, organize, and speak up about issues, but as I will 
explain, the practical outcomes of democracy are far from inclusive. 
Statistics Canada and the US Census Bureau have found that economic wellbeing is 
positively related to voting.19 In other words, the wealthier someone one is, the more likely they 
are to vote. Voting is the main institutional method of democratic decision-making (although 
not the only one), and since people in poverty rarely vote, their voices are less included in 
Western democracies. A recent study supports these findings: “[t]he higher (lower) individual 
income is, the higher (lower) individual engagement in conventional and unconventional 
political activities is.”20 This study argues that “income may be considered the most important 
individual-level determinant of political participation; all political activities are costly because 
 
18 James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 623. 
19 Statistics Canada, “Factors Associated with Voting,” Perspectives on Labour and Income, Minister of Industry, 
no. 75-001-X (2012). 
20 L. Cicatiello, S. Ercolano, and G. Gaeta, “Income distribution and political participation: a multilevel analysis,” 
Empirica 42 (2015): 451. The unconventional political activities considered are actions such as signing petitions, 
attending demonstrations, strikes, boycotts or occupations of buildings, and participating in political meetings and 
groups. 
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resources (time, money, skills) must be invested in order to carry them out.”21 People in poverty 
are systemically excluded from political activity, both formally and informally. 
Beyond this, a recent study proves that “economic elites and organized groups representing 
business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-
based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.”22 It examines 
a twenty-year period in the United states and finds that if large corporations and wealthy 
individuals want a law passed, there is nearly a 60% chance it will be passed. In the case of 
everyday voters, issues that almost no one supports and issues that almost everyone supports 
have a 30% chance of becoming law, i.e., the perspectives of everyday voters have nearly no 
impact. The authors conclude that “the preferences of the average American appear to have only 
a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy,”23 and that since 
“policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent 
Americans, […] America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened.”24 
Wealth gives the rich exclusive access to the formal political system, while everyday citizens 
have little to no influence on the formal decision-making process. 
Across the world, eight men—six of them Americans—own as much combined wealth as 
half of the human population.25 In the last three decades in Canada, the top one percent of 
 
21 Ibid., 450. 
22 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and 
Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 565. 
23 Ibid., 575 
24 Ibid., 577. 
25 Anna Ratcliff, “Just 8 men own same wealth as half the world,” Oxfam International (2017). 
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Canada’s income earners captured 37 percent of total income growth.26 The United States is 
similarly—and even more—unequal. A perfect example of which is the Walton family: “the six 
heirs to the Walmart empire command a wealth of $145 billion, which is equivalent to the net 
worth of 1,782,020 average American families.”27 While the top one percent of the U.S. 
population controls 36.7 percent of all American wealth, the bottom 40 percent own -0.9 percent, 
i.e., the bottom 40 percent are in debt and own no wealth.28 The richest countries in history 
(primarily governed by democracies) have extreme levels of wealth disparity. Although not all 
inequality is democratically destructive, the evidence is clear: while those in poverty are 
excluded from many forms of political activities and decision-making, economic elites have the 
greatest access in and success at influencing the decision-makers and the decision-making 
process. All this inequality exists despite the fact that democracy is meant to be a political 
system run by the majority of citizens, not by a select few.  
How does James suggest a method that rectifies the “problem of democracy?” The 
foundation for personal ethics is the interaction and mediation of felt human experience through 
communication, but this only occurs when others are included (and acknowledged) in one’s 
moral paradigm. And on a political level, inclusion of everyone in a democracy is the foundation 
 
26 Keith Banting and John Myles, “Framing the new inequality: The politics of income redistribution in Canada,” 
Income Inequality: The Canadian Story. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy (2016): 509-40. 
27 Joseph Stiglitz, “Inequality and economic growth” in Rethinking Capitalism, eds. Michael Jacobs and Mariana 
Mazzucato (New Jersey: Wiley Blackwell, 2016): 134-155. 
28 Tom Malleson, Fired Up about Capitalism (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2016), 33. An interesting and 
important fact regarding countries with vast income inequality is that they correlate with higher levels of social 
ills, including higher rates of mental illness, teen pregnancy, obesity, incarceration, and homicides, as well as 
lower levels of life expectancy, social trust, educative performance among children, and social mobility (Ibid., 
35). 
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of social ethics. Therefore, for James, the best method to solve problems of political exclusion 
is pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy, or less esoterically, pragmatic inclusion. This 
method is pragmatic because it begins with the consequences of actual experiments, namely the 
felt human experiences experiments cause; it is inclusive because it seeks solutions through 
including more voices in the discourse rather than prescribing outcomes,29 which is best 
institutionally established by its goal, an ethical democracy. For James, a true democracy is an 
expression of inclusion when formal institutions create the conditions for every individual and 
community to influence conventional decision-making processes and influence cultural norms, 
or common sense. This requires more than formal rights of democratic participation, it also 
includes a material basis so that no one in a democracy is excluded from political participation 
because of their level of poverty, and no one has greater access to participation because of their 
wealth.  
A democracy genuinely controlled by its citizens is the open-ended political goal prescribed 
by James, who—although never a political theorist—said, “Democracy is still on its trial. The 
civic genius of our people is its only bulwark.”30 Jamesian inclusion, when broadened to include 
institutions, calls for a form of democracy where human beings, by virtue of having and 
communicating felt human experiences—the foundation of ethics—are involved in decision-
making processes as much as possible. This inclusion creates a common sense that mirrors 
everyone’s demands, not solely the demands of the rich and influential. But Jamesian democracy 
 
29 Pragmatic inclusion is the practical and political instantiation of James’ ethical foundation, namely “pre-moral 
inclusion.” See ch. 2.4. 
30 William James, Memories and Studies, edited by Henry James, Jr. (New York: Longmans, Green, 1911), 42. 
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is not an end with defined goals, but open-ended, trusting the “civic genius” of ordinary people 
to find practical experiments that satisfy their demands.  
Pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy is my reworked version of Van Parijs’ real 
freedom for all. Van Parijs’ ideal society is one in which everyone has “freedom to do whatever 
one might want to do,”31 but pragmatic inclusion’s ideal is open. Ethical democracy, based in 
problems expressed by actual human beings, with the goal of expansive inclusion to solve these 
problems, is the idea of pragmatic inclusion. Van Parijs’ foundation is a biased abstraction, 
while pragmatic inclusion is neutrally based in the inclusion of practical human voices.32 Van 
Parijs’ arguments are overly individualistic, but pragmatic inclusion understands that socially-
constructed common sense produces particular types of human beings, including their tastes, 
values, and identities.33 Pragmatic inclusion also acknowledges that the basis for ethics on an 
individual and social level, i.e. inclusion, is democracy on a cultural and political scale, and 
therefore, since common sense influences everyone, protecting and enhancing democracy is the 
best mechanism for including all voices in common sense’s ethical dialogue. Van Parijs 
recognizes value only in economic and utilitarian individual preferences, whereas pragmatic 
inclusion sees all meaning as valuable, and all action as meaningful.34 Pragmatic inclusion is 
the foundation and ideal missing in the BI debate because neither its inclusive foundation nor 
its democratic goal are abstract, individualistic, or economistic. It is practical, social, and based 
in the understanding that all activity is meaningful in the creation of common sense. 
 
31 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 20. 
32 See ch. 2. 
33 See ch. 3.2. 
34 See ch 3.3 and 3.4. 
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4.3.1 Van Parijs’ Rejection of a Democratic Foundation 
The previous chapters identified unreconcilable problems in Van Parijs’ argument for a BI. 
Before I posit my Jamesian argument for pragmatic inclusion as the best justification for BI, I 
should discuss Van Parijs’ perspective on democracy in Real Freedom for All. He acknowledges 
that “Democracy, no doubt, matters on many counts. It may even empirically turn out to be a 
necessary condition for realizing a free society.”35 This claim is made within the paradigm in 
which real freedom (to do whatever one might want to do) is the measure of social justice. Recall 
that freedom, not inclusion or democracy, is the goal of Van Parijs’ liberalism, and as such, he 
ultimately argues that a democracy is inadequate to attain this goal: “a (maximally) democratic 
society cannot plausibly be said to coincide by definition with a society of (maximally) free 
people.”36 I will make two points to against Van Parijs’ position. First, inclusion is the ethical 
basis for the development of common sense, rather than real freedom—for which Van Parijs 
advocates. Thus, Van Parijs’ rejection of democracy as a goal of BI is unrelated to the current 
case because he rejects democracy as a foundation for achieving real freedom. The Jamesian 
case advocates for democracy (through its basis in inclusion) as the pre-moral practical principle 
on which ethics should stand. Second, the only democracy that he considers is socialist. He 
defines democracy as “a society that subjects everything to collective decision-making and gives 
each of its members an equal power in the decisions it takes, […a society of] collectivism, of 
 
35 Van Parijs, Real Freedom, 8. 
36 Ibid. 
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public ownership of both people and capital.”37 He makes this claim without any evidence; he 
does not consider democracy without socialism, even though a socialistic democracy is not 
democracy’s only form. While democratic socialism is a potential end of pragmatic inclusion, 
democracies choose their own ends, and as such, Van Parijs either misunderstands or perverts 
the definition of democracy through a straw man fallacy. 
Pragmatic inclusion defines a democratic society as a society in which all citizens have 
access to the full range of political participation, or more simply, a society in which everyone is 
included in (formal and informal) decision-making processes. This does not necessarily mean 
an economic overhaul of capitalism (although it could); rather, it means a society structured in 
a way in which voices have the power to prove an experiment as a success or a failure. While 
Van Parijs rejects democracy as the best ideal of society, I argue that it is the only ideal towards 
which an ethical society ought to strive. 
Political institutions help perpetuate and change social ethics (or common sense), and 
therefore have the responsibility in this argument to exhibit James’ moral method on a large and 
open-ended scale by providing the material means to engage in democracy. All citizens are 
impacted by political institutions and social ideologies, and therefore every perspective should 
be heard by these forms of common sense. Reform is necessary because communities are 
excluded from social and political influence because of poverty, and the wealthiest groups of 
people have exclusive access. The thesis of this chapter is that BI the best ethical argument in 
favour of BI is that BI is indispensable in attaining this pragmatic inclusion for an ethical 
 
37 Ibid. 
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democracy. Thus far, this thesis demonstrated that Van Parijs’ real freedom for all is problematic 
(and fundamentally deficient) and that James’ social ethics can be used to solve the problems in 
Van Parijs’ argument. Pragmatic inclusion, then, is the final phase of this thesis. The best 
argument for BI is in pragmatic inclusion, and pragmatic inclusion can be realized through 
policies like BI. Pragmatic inclusion is a better theoretical and practical basis and argument for 
BI than is Van Parijs’ real freedom for all. The next section investigates existing literature that 
justifies BI as a core component of democracy but argues that the arguments provided are 
insufficient to attain pragmatic inclusion and are unconvincing because of that fact. 
 
4.4 Basic Income and Democracy Literature  
Nearly every argument for BI is based in individual freedom, whether it be liberal-
egalitarianism,38 Republican freedom,39 Rawlsian political liberalism,40 or “independentarian” 
status freedom,41 amongst many other examples. But a small group of researchers, most notably 
Carole Pateman, Michael Goodhart, and Leticia Morales, argue for a democratic case for BI. 
There are two broad models of the democratic defence of BI: the Pateman-Goodman and the 
Morales models. The Pateman-Goodhart model broadly conceives of democracy as a political 
decision-making process in which formal and informal political participation is considered but 
has definite goals beyond democracy that it aims towards. The Morales model conceives of 
 
38 Van Parijs, Real Freedom. 
39 Philip Pettit, On People Terms. A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Robert Saxton Taylor, Exit Left: Markets and Mobility in Republican Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017). 
40 Simon Birnbaum, Basic Income Reconsidered: Social Justice, Liberalism and the Demands of Equality (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
41 Karl Widerquist, Independence, Propertylessness and Basic Income (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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democracy in a more limited sense, focussed on the indirect impacts BI would have on the poor’s 
participation in formal politics, namely, an increase in free time to consider electoral politics, 
less stigma around poverty, and better self-esteem amongst the poor. I investigate the two 
models to see if either appropriately argue for BI as a necessary part of democracy and conclude 
that each is inadequate and requires pragmatic inclusion as a basis. 
 
4.4.1 The Pateman-Goodhart Model 
Pateman’s and Goodhart’s perspective is based in democratic self-government as “a 
political form of freedom in contrast to an economic form.”42 Its first feature is an analogy in 
which voting and BI are equivalent, where “a basic income should be seen as a fundamental or 
democratic right, like universal suffrage.”43 Second, that BI emancipates people insofar that it 
guarantees the enjoyment of other basic rights; as Goodhart states, “[BI] satisfies the 
fundamental economic right to a guaranteed subsistence that democracy demands.”44 These 
arguments appeal to BI as abstract right and as a means to a definite goal, namely the enjoyment 
of other abstract rights. As I showed in chapter two, felt human experience is the basis of ethics, 
not abstraction, and inclusion (or in a political form, democracy) precedes and does not prescribe 
definite goals; democracy demands nothing but the voices of everyone. As such, an argument 
for BI based in abstraction with prescribed ends falls back into the liberal paradigm, even if the 
 
42 Carole Pateman, “Freedom and Democratization: Why Basic Income is to be preferred to Basic Capital,” in K. 
Dowding et al. (eds.), The Ethics of Stakeholding (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 132. 
43 Ibid., 131. 
44 Michael Goodhart, “‘None So Poor that He is Compelled to Sell Himself’ Democracy, Subsistence, and Basic 
Income,” in Economic Rights, eds. L. Minkler and S. Hertel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
109. 
 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 100 
abstractions and ends are democratic in nature. Morales also argues that BI is not an abstract 
right or a means toward particular ends and states that the Pateman-Goodhart model assumes a 
“substantive conception of democracy”45 which fails to appreciate “value pluralism” and posits 
a set of valuable outcomes which neglect “all alternative goals that citizens may reasonably try 
to advance.”46 Thus, I suggest from the Jamesian perspective in which ethics is based in human 
experience and democratic inclusion does not prescribe ends that the abstract and ends-based 
aspects of the Pateman-Goodhart model be rejected. 
The following features of the model, I believe, are more persuasive. The third feature of the 
Pateman-Goodhart model is that BI creates the condition for equal social standing amongst 
citizens. They argue that BI helps “remove the temptation for some citizens to see others as less 
worthy of respect, and so as lesser citizens, because of their lack of economic resources.”47 
Pateman argues that BI can restructure marriage and family structures as well as political ones, 
because when employment and income are detached, women are less likely to be considered 
second-class citizens. And lastly, since BI creates the freedom to say “no” to employment, the 
Pateman-Goodhart case for BI based in democracy argues that it promotes collective self-
government. It does so by creating space for people to develop themselves, either politically or 
through other methods: “a basic income would allow individuals at any time to do voluntary or 
political work […or time] to learn to surf, to write or paint, to devote themselves to family time, 
or to have a quiet period of self-reassessment or contemplation.”48 The inclusion of people 
 
45 Leticia Morales, “The Democratic Case for a Basic Income,” Law, Ethics, and Philosophy 6 (2018): 126. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Pateman, “Freedom and Democratization,” 146. 
48 Carole Pateman, “Democratizing Citizenship: Some Advantages of a Basic Income,” Politics and Society 32, 
no. 1 (2004): 96. 
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otherwise considered unworthy of respect changes the contents of social dialogue, and therefore 
has the potential to shift relations of status. And BI will provide opportunities for communities 
and individuals to engage in formal and informal political and social decision-making, as well 
as the relaxation and leisure necessary for engaging in socio-political arenas. These features fit 
nicely into the paradigm of pragmatic inclusion because the Pateman-Goodhart model advocates 
for BI; it is the floor on which people can engage in and change their worlds. 
Morales disagrees with any attention paid to BI’s impact on informal political participation, 
primarily because the BI scheme required to satisfy the goals mentioned above, she argues, 
“may be too radical or too demanding under present socio-economic conditions.”49 Her 
suspicions are not unwarranted: as BI does not fully rectify the vast disparity of wealth in the 
West, academics argue that BI could have negative effects on women and workers,50 and BI 
would not provide absolute freedom from racial, gendered, and economic oppression. Morales 
argues that the Pateman-Goodhart model “offers no real account of how precisely a basic income 
would improve political participation or democratic skills.”51 Instead, she argues that “What we 
need is an argument that explains why a basic income may improve individuals’ opportunities 
to participate in the political process.”52  
 
4.4.2 The Morales Model 
 
49 Morales, “The Democratic Case,” 127. 
50 Ingrid Robeyns, “Will a Basic Income Do Justice to Women?,” Analyse und Kritik 23, no. 1 (2001); A. 
Gourevitch, “The Limits of a Basic Income: Means and Ends of Workplace Democracy,” Basic Income Studies 
11, no. 1 (2016). 
51 Morales, “The Democratic Case,” 129. 
52 Ibid., 130. 
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Morales states that formal political participation—not civic or informal participation—is 
the “foundation of legitimate political authority,”53 and that “a more modest model of 
democracy that prioritizes broad and effective political participation in decision-making 
processes, offers a more plausible democratic case for a universal basic income.”54 Morales 
claims that citizens engage in informal political activities such as demonstrations and boycotts 
when they “feel excluded from conventional forms of participation,”55 so she argues for BI 
exclusively focussed on formal political participation. Money is a material precondition for 
formal political participation, and income inequality undermines formal political participation, 
she argues; therefore, BI is a promising solution.  
Morales does not consider direct impacts on formal participation, such as the ability to pay 
for voter registration or transportation to voting booths. She argues that the democratic value of 
BI is best understood when considering its indirect effects. She states that a BI “might politicize 
citizens because it gives them a stake in society”56 by avoiding negative experiences with case 
workers and incentivizing participation through formal channels. Further, it helps diminish the 
impact of the “scarcity mindset” in which people can only think about their immediate needs, 
and opens up the possibility to follow public debate, participate in political organizations, and 
hold political representatives accountable. Morales concludes that BI indirectly effects formal 
political participation of the poor by “freeing up time, energy, and ‘cognitive bandwidth’, and 
by positively affecting their status and beliefs about themselves and others.”57 
 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 135. 
55 Ibid., 132. 
56 Ibid., 134. 
57 Ibid., 135. 
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Morales’ critique of the Pateman-Goodman model—that aiming towards specific ends 
undermines the independent value of democracy—is hypocritical because her argument also is 
ends-oriented, namely toward more equitable status relations (for which both models advocate) 
and a positive self-image amongst the poorest population. Her critique of feasibility fails to 
consider the wider implications of BI; although an impact on gender roles and the poor’s 
engagement with politics are prescribed ends in the Pateman-Goodhart model, a more robust 
democracy is a condition under which such ends are possible, not one that guarantees these ends. 
Further, Morales’ model is fundamentally individual, and does not consider BI’s possible 
cultural effects.  
Neither the Pateman-Goodhart nor the Morales models are sufficient in defending BI as an 
aspect of democracy. The Pateman-Goodhart model is based in abstractions with particular 
ends, and the Morales argument ignores the fact that democracy happens inside and outside of 
formal institutions. An argument for BI needs a robust philosophical basis, such as the one I 
have outlined throughout this text and define below. Although I will use the best of these two 
arguments, namely Pateman-Goodhart’s expansive view of democracy and Morales’ detailed 
approach to the politicization possible with a BI, in my argument, only a BI argument based in 
pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy sufficiently accounts for the demands of inclusion 
and democracy. 
 
4.5 The Jamesian Definition of Basic Income 
Thus far, it is clear that the welfare system and Western democracies have significant 
problems, and the current methods of justifying BI in freedom and in democracy have obvious 
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flaws. As such, I propose a brief outline of a further possible method, namely one based in 
pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy, i.e., based in inclusively listening to those 
impacted by contemporary social assistance programs (pragmatic inclusion), identifying 
systemic problems of exclusion (namely the problem of welfare and the problem of democracy), 
and with the only explicit end being a more expansive realm of influence on common sense and 
cultural norms (an ethical democracy). The definition I suggest is remarkably simple and lies in 
a BI with clear parameters, something that the aforementioned authors omit. BI is an income 
that adequately provides for every individual’s basic needs, irrespective of employment, funded 
by distributing the excessive wealth of the ultra-rich. A connection to basic needs, the 
decoupling of income and employment, and taxation of the wealthy are pragmatic inclusion’s 
only requirements for BI.  
The practical application of this BI proposal is left open-ended. In the same way that James 
says, “there is no such thing as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance,”58 I 
argue that there is no such thing as a single correct way to implement BI. Whether it be 
distributed in cash or in kind, for individuals or households, in a lump sum or regular 
instalments, for everyone or for only for the poor—as long as the above three aspects of the 
definition are respected, the goal of pragmatic inclusion is accomplished. As long as these 
requirements remain the principles of welfare reform, democratic processes are left open to 
make changes to this policy. James says that “there can be no final Truth in Ethics any more 
than in Physics, until the last man has had his experience and said his say.”59 And until the last 
 
58 William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” in The Writings of William James, 610. 
59 Ibid., 611 
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human says his or her say about BI, and more generally, welfare and the power disparity of 
inequality, there can be no final truth in pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy. 
 
4.5.1 Solution to the Problem of Welfare 
There are strong arguments about why these requirements of BI create pragmatic inclusion 
for an ethical democracy. BI needs to provide an income adequate to cover everyone’s basic 
needs because, as Morales mentions and as I have argued, a precondition to participation in civic 
and political life is the abolishment of poverty. This aspect of BI (towards which Van Parijs also 
aims) provides everyone with a floor under which they cannot fall, so that individuals and 
communities have the means to do more than simply survive. As poverty is “the most important 
individual-level determinant of political participation;”60 if everyone is guaranteed an income 
sufficient to cover basic needs, they are automatically included in spheres of life otherwise 
inaccessible to them, namely, informal and formal political participation. I define basic needs 
as primarily physical needs (although this is open to revision), which means that BI must provide 
enough money for everyone to afford adequate food and housing. In practice, depending on the 
location of housing in Canada, BI should be tailored by and for municipalities, not the nation or 
the province, and would be around $1500 per month, or $18,000 per year.61 If welfare, 
distributed in the form of BI, is at a level high enough to afford basic needs, a primary condition 
necessary for an ethical democracy is met.  
 
60 Cicatiello et al. “Income distribution and political participation,” 450. 
61 Statistics Canada, “Survey of Household Spending,” The Daily, 2018. 
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Economic inclusion involves formal and informal decision-making processes, such as 
voting, running for office, donating and participation in electoral campaigns, and also an income 
sufficient for covering costs of joining unions, attending demonstrations, and creating and 
joining civic groups outside of electoral politics. Informal political participation exceeds even 
the definition in the Pateman-Goodhart model; workplaces, neighbourhoods, schools, and 
families are also centers of political action. As James shows us, wherever there is human action, 
there is experimental political participation, because the status quo is produced and maintained 
by structures beyond government policy. A young woman who is a single mother and working 
two jobs to support her family has very little impact on the status quo, because she does not have 
the time or mental energy to support or resist norms and ideologies in her life. But with a BI, 
she has the means to rethink sexist stereotypes, read about ideas beyond her moral paradigm, 
cultivate friendships that help her grow and change into a better person, and develop her 
capacities in expressing her perspective and listening to others.  
This hypothetical situation shows that not only formal processes—i.e. those that change 
laws—form common sense, but that every activity can impact the socio-political status quo. 
And for this reason, as outlined in chapter three, BI should be provided irrespective of 
employment. All activity is meaningful, but only the activity that produces economic growth is 
(currently) rewarded with the means of survival and therefore, inclusion in decision-making 
processes. BI rectifies this by decoupling income from economic activity; any work requirement 
in a BI devalues non-economic activity and excludes the poorest people in a society from 
opportunities outside of employment that make a difference in common sense. Volunteering and 
creative pursuits are two of the many examples of non-economic activity that have value in a 
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community and should not exclude those with the least wealth and power. As Van Parijs states, 
the ability to say “no” to an employer will force workplaces to compete for employees by 
incentivizing them with better pay or benefits. Alternatively, these businesses could invest in 
automation, which will again allow more worker-involvement in the society. When 
communities and individuals are not forced to work to survive, they can fill their time with a 
host of other valuable activities, such as creating their own small businesses, caring for their 
families, and developing their capacities. 
 
4.5.2 Solution to the Problem of Democracy 
The problem of inequality and the influence that the wealthy have on electoral democracy 
is the final problem left for this definition of BI. The previous two aspects of the BI of pragmatic 
inclusion work to solve the problem of welfare. To be unemployed or underemployed would no 
longer mean a life of desperation. The problem of democracy is addressed by the condition that 
BI acquires its funding through distribution of the wealth of the super-rich which generally 
means the richest 1% of individuals and corporations. This transference of wealth could be 
accomplished in many ways, including a wealth tax, a maximum income, a progressive and 
aggressive income tax scheme, or an overhaul of the structure of business ownership based in 
workplace democracy. And it would most likely require high taxes on the wealthiest 
corporations, ending massive subsidization of corporations, and closing tax-loopholes; but 
again, there is no one right way to implement BI. Taxation on the ultra-rich would reduce the 
wealth of the richest people in a society and therefore reduce their influence in politics and on 
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ideology more generally. It would not solve the problem of unequal access completely, but BI 
would take important steps toward a society with less income (and influence) inequality. 
An important objection to this aspect of BI’s definition is the reaction of the 1%. Clearly 
most rich people would respond negatively to higher taxation, and this response is as human 
and felt as the “cries of the wounded” from the people in poverty that I outlined. Does this mean 
that pragmatic inclusion is unfairly biased towards the preferences of the poor and even excludes 
the voices of the rich? No, because its goal is inclusion, not the appeasement of preferences. The 
voices of the rich are absolutely represented in contemporary decision-making processes—their 
voices are heard and usually central in the status quo—and with a BI the rich will still have 
influence, albeit in slightly less dominant form. But other voices, namely those of people in 
poverty and on welfare, are marginalized, as James states, “Pent in under every system of moral 
rules are innumerable persons whom it weighs upon and goods which it represses.”62 The moral 
rules of common sense govern the lives of everyone, but not everyone has the material means 
necessary to influence common sense. The purpose of BI is not to help one group and hurt 
another, it is to create the conditions in which everyone, despite wealth and structural economic 
forces, has the means to participate in the democratic dialogue so that common sense becomes 
an equilibrium that accurately reflects the demands of the people. Preference is not a factor in 
the argument for BI—BI is the condition for ethical deliberation based in felt human experience, 
and the common sense, habits, and preferences that the ethical deliberation produces. 
 
62 James, “Moral Philosopher,” 624. 
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Solutions to the problem of democracy (and its current state of inequality) are also an aspect 
of the rest of pragmatic inclusion’s definition of BI. If everyone is given the platform on which 
they can advocate for their needs, and governments and cultural ideologies reflect these needs, 
the majority could favour experimenting with new and different economic systems that rectify 
inequality. Perhaps people with a BI will implement a solution that has not been considered in 
our deeply exclusive democracy. Pragmatic Inclusion for an ethical democracy leaves such 
decisions to democracy. A truly inclusive democracy would most likely make changes that help 
the majority of citizens, i.e., not the 1%, and therefore one could predict particular outcomes, 
but never prescribe them. Whatever the outcome, it will be a society built on the maximum 
number of voices, rather than the perspectives of a handful of elites.  
BI’s only requirements are meeting basic needs, unconditionality regardless of 
employment, and funding coming from the wealthiest in society, which is a means of achieving 
pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy. No one is theoretically excluded from social, 
civic, or political activities because of a lack of income, every type of activity is valued, and the 
disparity of influence is reduced. An ethical democracy acknowledges the decision-making 
processes in a culture reach further than electoral politics; only after people’s basic needs are 
met can they become involved in civic organizations, social movements, and unions, and on an 
even smaller scale, basic needs are a prerequisite to communicative family and community 
interactions. This type of BI would radically change a society into a more inclusive and 
democratic one. But the rest of James’ experimental method—experimenting, listening, and 
revising—is unguaranteed. BI is not the only way to create pragmatic inclusion for an ethical 
democracy, but it is a fundamental component. To create the conditions for James’ method and 
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to further the goals of pragmatic inclusion require supplemental institutional policy, which will 
be suggested in the section below. 
 
4.6 Further Considerations in the Pursuit of an Ethical Democracy 
A BI, paid at a level sufficient to cover basic needs, irrespective of employment, funded 
through taxation of the wealthy is the prescription of pragmatic inclusion that includes as many 
voices as possible in the creation and maintenance of common sense in formal and informal 
political spheres. But an argument for radical inclusion through BI as a prerequisite to a better 
society is not blind to the problems of democracy; radical inclusion does not mean pure 
majoritarianism. Pragmatic inclusion is not naïve to the fact that people often advocate for ideas 
contrary to their own needs or are ignorant to the ways in which they think. Instead it seeks to 
rethink democracy with BI as one of its necessary components. A democracy begins with 
economic inclusion, but it does not end there. Many other social changes are required to create 
the best common sense, i.e. one that best represents the people it influences. The following are 
some supplementary policy suggestions that mesh with James’ ethical method that will further 
the goals of pragmatic inclusion. They are inspired by the “social virtues” of William James as 
defined by Trygve Throntveit, namely experimentation, historical wisdom, and empathy. I 
suggest policy measures that follow from each of them. 
Experimentation, which I explained in detail in chapter two, is the method whereby 
individuals and collectives realize goods and evils. As James says in a letter, a genuine 
understanding of the universe waits on “the total ‘evidence’, which only the race can draw,” but 
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that evidence “has to include the experiments of individuals in itself.”63 BI is the first method to 
create the conditions for experimentation because it allows for “articulating, testing, and 
deliberating over moral hypotheses and their consequences,”64 because it includes everyone 
(especially those currently repressed) in this process. A further suggestion is the support for and 
creation of more workplace democracies, whether they are co-operatively owned, or led by 
boards with strong union (or worker) representation, so that workers’ voices are included in the 
governance and control of their places of employment. Another idea to create pragmatic 
inclusion is to promote investments in co-operative housing so tenants are similarly included 
the control of their homes. Electoral reform, such as proportional representation, is an additional 
supplement to BI, so that elected governments better embody the votes and the interests of the 
people they represent. And finally, the experimentation process can be best realized with a well-
funded public healthcare system because illness should not exclude anyone from engaging in 
the socio-political world. All these suggestions give more people the ability to creatively 
experiment in their world, regardless of wealth, status, or identity.  
The second social virtue of William James—historical wisdom—explains that a democratic 
society should understand the ways that moral ideals have shifted and changed through time, 
which ideals have been overcome and ought to stay silent, and why conventionally accepted 
ideals have dominance. As Throntveit explains, “history and the society it shapes provides 
 
63 William James et al., “WJ to L. T. Hobhouse, August 12, 1904,” in The Correspondence of William James, 
edited by Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley, 12 volumes (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1992–2004), 10: 449. 
64 Trygve Throntviet, “William James’s Ethical Republic.” Journal of the History of Ideas 72 (2011): 272. 
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resources from which all experimenters draw, and imposes constraints under which it 
operates.”65 Public education is not an explicit end of BI, but both education and BI are methods 
of attaining an ethical democracy, therefore a society built on pragmatic inclusion would also 
require a robust, accessible, and well-funded public education system. This public education 
system should be diverse in its curriculum, involving ideas beyond that which is considered 
normal in the status quo, in particular ideas from non-western and Indigenous societies. 
Publicly-funded education (ideally from preschool to university) provides the tools necessary 
for listening to the voices of others and fully taking advantage of the inclusion provided by BI, 
as well as creating good habits among the citizenry. Further, publicly-funded museums, which 
create historical awareness about how a society came to be, is another suggested essential. 
Finally, the social virtue of empathy has two institutional forms: those that restrict 
unempathetic virtues from being cultivated, and those that cultivate empathy. Clearly empathy 
is a key virtue in pragmatic inclusion, because genuine listening is essential to test an action’s 
or a policy’s moral quality. Listening requires attention, and James says in The Principles of 
Psychology, that attention, “out of all the sensations yielded, picks out certain ones as worthy of 
its notice and supresses the rest.”66 To guarantee attention towards, and therefore the judgement 
of empathic worthiness of, other moral perspectives is difficult, but it begins by limiting anti-
empathic ideologies from spreading. A single voice has a multitude of content, and content that 
is essentially exclusionary—such as white supremacy—is not moral or immoral, but anti-moral 
 
65 Trygve Throntveit, William James and the Quest for an Ethical Republic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014), 104.  
66 William James, “The Stream of Thought,” in The Writings of William James, 70. 
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in a Jamesian paradigm. Because inclusion is the source of ethics (and the goal of BI), beliefs 
that exclude people from a society undermine the possibility for and conditions of an ethical 
democracy. Inclusion is pre-moral while exclusion is anti-moral because exclusion violates 
morality’s foundation. As a result, to create the best conditions for an empathic public, hate 
speech laws are a suggested supplement to BI in order to stifle anti-moral ideologies and to 
create the conditions for inclusive democratic dialogue.67 The content of every voice is 
acceptable and included in pragmatic inclusion except when it undermines the condition for 
such a society: the ever-expanding inclusion of voices. James claims that a consequence of his 
philosophy is the “democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality,” or, “the outward 
tolerance of whatever is not itself intolerant.”68  
Examples of institutional mechanisms that cultivate empathy, on the other hand, are an 
independent, free press, held to high journalistic standards that reports felt impacts that might 
otherwise go unnoticed, affirmative action programs, and integrated city planning so that 
workplaces and communities include as many different voices as possible. Further, 
reconciliation with indigenous peoples and other marginalized populations in order to take steps 
towards creating bonds of trust amongst groups that have been oppressed by colonial countries 
are suggestions. In the BI pilot in Finland, it was reported that people on BI reported a greater 
sense of social and political trust relative to the control group on contemporary welfare.69 Thus, 
 
67 This brings up the issue of who is considered human. It is easier to state reasons not to consider someone non-
human, notably race, gender, sexual orientation, ability, ethnicity, etc., but this thesis is not the place for such a 
debate.  
68 William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1899), v.  
69 Kangas et al., “The basic income experiment 2017–2018 in Finland,” 19-20. 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 114 
empathy is already a reportedly direct result of BI, but the aforementioned changes could also 
increase empathy, which is needed in order for James’ experimental process, and pragmatic 
inclusion, to fully succeed. 
If the three social virtues are all achieved through implementing the suggestions above—or 
alternatives that have similar outcomes, a utopian—yet attainable—pragmatic inclusion will 
exist. But these suggestions are meant only as beneficial additions to BI in attaining pragmatic 
inclusion for an ethical democracy. They are not essential in this argument but will help create 
a society where BI, as an instrument of pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy, is most 
effective. BI achieves the pre-moral condition of inclusion as the foundation upon which a truly 
inclusive and ethical democracy may be built. Once the condition of pre-moral, pragmatic 
inclusion is attained (BI), more conditions can to be implemented in order for James’ 
experimental method to be practiced most effectively.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reconstructed an argument for BI with the principle of pragmatic inclusion 
for an ethical democracy, rather than Van Parijs’ real freedom for all, as its basis. I did so by 
stressing the voices of people impacted by contemporary welfare systems and examining 
experiments with BI to show that welfare systems in the West require reform. Next, because 
political influence is distributed according to wealth and the levels of western inequality exclude 
the poor and give special access to the rich, I argue that a more inclusive democracy is necessary. 
The solution provided was pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy and the practical 
example was a BI, paid at a level sufficient to cover basic needs, irrespective of employment, 
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and funded through taxation on the wealthiest individuals and corporations. This solution is 
based in the writings of William James, and specifically his social ethics which show that 
inclusion precedes ethics, and ethics is a method of social mediation. In order to fully explain 
this definition, I drew upon existing literature that coupled democracy with BI advocacy and 
showed that the Jamesian pragmatic inclusion principle is the best foundation for this argument. 
Finally, I suggested policies that will maximize the democratic impact of BI with the social 
virtues of William James posited by Trygve Throntveit. 
Some critiques may decry BI as a socialistic pipe dream, but it has been proven to work in 
bettering the lives of people in poverty, and it has been proven that it can pay for itself.70 As 
James states, “I will now confess my own utopia. I devoutly believe in the reign of peace and in 
the gradual advent of some sort of socialistic equilibrium.”71 This equilibrium is best constructed 
through listening, experimenting, and revising our experiments. BI is an example of a tool that 
creates pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy, and pragmatic inclusion is the principle 
that, with the help of BI, can expand the scope of influence, wealth, and power in order to move 
ever-closer to a world where everyone is included. 
 
70 Bregman, Utopia for Realists, 104. 
71 William James, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” in The Writings of William James, 667. 
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Conclusion 
1. Summary of Contents 
In this thesis, I investigated a new justification for basic income (BI) that is based in the 
social ethics of William James. I proposed a Jamesian “pragmatic inclusion for an ethical 
democracy” as an alternative to “real freedom for all,” as theorized by Philippe Van Parijs, a 
leading advocate for BI. After thoroughly explaining real freedom for all, I identified three main 
issues in this foundational argument and argue that pragmatic inclusion for an ethical 
democracy, as a philosophical system, solves them. The first inadequacy is the most 
fundamental: Van Parijs bases his defence of BI on the ideal of “maximin real freedom.” This 
abstract notion overlooks the fact that felt human experience is the origin of ethics and that 
demands fall into an equilibrium based on who is included in the social realm. As I show through 
the social ethics of William James, an ethical philosophy should begin by studying the 
contemporary socio-political climate, listening to the voices of people marginalized by the status 
quo, and view ethics as a practical and human endeavour, rather than something to be understood 
through abstract intellection.  
The second issue with Van Parijs’ philosophical paradigm is his individualism: he reduces 
human beings to isolated aggregates of essential talents and preferences, rather than 
acknowledging that the human self and its preferences are in large part socially and culturally 
constructed in the Jamesian “common sense.” The result of such individualism is a philosophy, 
and, more importantly, practical policy initiatives, that I argue are biased against people in 
poverty and persons with disabilities. The final problem with Van Parijs’ philosophical 
worldview is that he diminishes the value of non-economic activity by arguing that present-day 
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salaries, incomes, and jobs contain inherited value from the past that ought to be distributed 
through BI. This perspective ignores the fact that non-waged activities also have value. Instead, 
James shows, ethics and politics are the production of the habits and norms of common sense 
which is produced by all forms of activity.  Pragmatic inclusion is a better paradigm in which 
BI should be argued, one that has its foundations in human experience, a social definition of the 
human self, and values all human activity. It is a deeply human philosophy that can solve 
practical human problems. 
The definition of BI that I provide is minimal. It suggests three features (two of which were 
part of Van Parijs’ original definition) necessary to attain the open-ended goal of pragmatic 
inclusion, which is an ethical democracy. These features are a BI 1) set at a level sufficient to 
cover basic needs, 2) without a work-requirement, and 3) paid by taxing the wealthiest members 
of society. These features solve both the welfare problem (people on welfare currently are 
unable to live a full life) and the democracy problem (the richest people and groups in a society 
have greater access the decision-making processes in a society, especially compared to the 
poorest population). This definition of BI effectively abolishes poverty and curbs the wealth of 
the most powerful people, and in doing so, distributes influence on the common sense of a 
society through (economically) including everyone in formal and informal politics by ensuring 
that no one is excluded because of poverty. 
A BI that is both justified through Jamesian pragmatic inclusion for an ethical democracy 
and defined as an income set at a level sufficient to cover basic needs, without a work-
requirement, and paid by taxing the wealthiest members of society overcomes the problems of 
Van Parijs’ freedom-based and individualist BI. While the Jamesian philosophical perspective 
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and justification is essential in more coherent BI advocacy, the remaining features of Van Parijs’ 
BI definition, “[1] a regular income [2] paid in cash [3] to every individual member of a society, 
[4] irrespective of income from other sources,”1 are left optional, and should be examined more 
through a Jamesian lens in future studies. Further considerations of policy proposals to enrich 
the pragmatist project for BI are suggested in the final sections of chapter four, but this thesis 
laid the groundwork for any follow-up research about ethical social assistance, namely that 
ethics always begins in inclusion. 
 
2. Possible Directions for Basic Income and Pragmatism Research 
The focus of this thesis was primarily on the new foundation and new ends for BI. Further 
research on the other aspects of Van Parijs’ argument is required in order to fully reform the 
argument. Other aspects include questions around extra allocations for people with disabilities; 
since undominated diversity is an unacceptable principle to provide these allocations, should 
pragmatists accept that BI is set at the same level for everyone? What about children or the 
elderly? Considering James’ focus on the part over the whole,2 and his empathy for unique needs 
and perspectives,3 I hypothesize that a particularized BI would be preferable, but a full argument 
is necessary to defend this hypothesis. Further, as indicated in chapter 4.6, there are many other 
political policies that should be defended as things that grow from pragmatic inclusion and help 
attain the goal of an ethical democracy. 
 
1 Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a 
Sane Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 4. 
2 William James, “The Stream of Thought,” in The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. J. 
McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 21-73. 
3 William James, “On A Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” in The Writings of William James, 629-44. 
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Another way to move forward in thought lies in advancing the philosophy of pragmatism 
and the social ethics therein, with special focus on James. Of course, there are other pragmatists 
that more easily align with socio-political arguments, including John Dewey, George Herbert 
Mead, Jane Addams, Sidney Hook, Roberto Ungar, Robert B. Talisse, and even quasi-
pragmatists such as Jürgen Habermas, Cornel West, and W. E. B. Du Bois. These scholars’ 
contributions to a political pragmatism should be investigated and used to bolster the ideas 
outlined above. But James is a predecessor to all of these thinkers, and along with Charles 
Sanders Peirce, began the American school of pragmatism. The social and political effects of 
James’ ideas, especially regarding his relationship to democracy, should continue to be studied 
in order to better justify and broaden the proposal outlined above. The belief that James is an 
individualist should be eradicated from scholarship, because his individualism is always situated 
in a social world. 
Further, what practically has created and continues to create such extreme inequality in the 
West should be further investigated (always situated in pragmatic inclusion). What are the ways 
in which rich populations impact democracy and why do they have this power? This will require 
ongoing historical, economic, and philosophical studies. And what about other crises in the 
world, particular global warming? How can BI help reduce the impacts of climate change? This 
text based all value and ethical activity around human feeling and activity—should the activity 
of nature be included in the foundation of ethics? Or is nature an aspect of the human? And 
more ethnographies, investigative journalism, and fiction and non-fiction books should be 
written by and about the experiences of people in poverty in order to create a society that hears 
and listens to the “cries of the wounded.”  
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Clearly, the suggestion most appropriate to this project is a policy proposal, namely a BI 
with the three requirements listed above. I have argued and truly believe that this proposal is 
philosophically justified and ethically imperative. But its realization will not come without 
work. I implore my readers to take up James’ doctrine of meliorism, which “treats salvation as 
neither necessary nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of 
a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become.”4 BI is a step 
towards the possible salvation of this world. James says the following about meliorism, but it 
applies to the outcome of BI as well: “If none work, it will fail. If each does his best, it will not 
fail. Its destiny hangs on an if.”5 So let us all work as if our ideas and actions will make a 
difference, and basic income—and even the salvation of the world—can be realized.  
 
4 William James, “Pragmatism and Religion,” The Writings of William James, 466-7.  
5 William James, “Faith and the Right to Believe,” The Writings of William James, 739. 
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